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Abstract
Secure Virtual Machine Migration in Cloud Data Centers
Arash Eghtesadi
While elasticity represents a valuable asset in cloud computing environments, it may bring critical
security issues. In the cloud, virtual machines (VMs) are dynamically and frequently migrated
across data centers from one host to another. This frequent modiﬁcation in the topology requires
constant reconﬁguration of security mechanisms particularly as we consider, in terms of ﬁrewalls,
intrusion detection/prevention as well as IPsec policies. However, managing manually complex
security rules is time-consuming and error-prone. Furthermore, scale and complexity of data cen-
ters are continually increasing, which makes it difﬁcult to rely on the cloud provider administrators
to update and validate the security mechanisms.
In this thesis, we propose a security veriﬁcation framework with a particular interest in the
abovementioned security mechanisms to address the issue of security policy preservation in a
highly dynamic context of cloud computing. This framework enables us to verify that the global
security policy after the migration is consistently preserved with respect to the initial one. Thus, we
propose a systematic procedure to verify security compliance of ﬁrewall policies, intrusion detec-
tion/prevention, and IPsec conﬁgurations after VM migration. First, we develop a process algebra
called cloud calculus, which allows specifying network topology and security conﬁgurations. It
also enables specifying the virtual machines migration along with their security policies.
iii
Then, the distributed ﬁrewall conﬁgurations in the involved data centers are deﬁned according
to the network topology expressed using cloud calculus. We show how our veriﬁcation problem
can be reduced to a constraint satisfaction problem that once solved allows reasoning about ﬁrewall
trafﬁc ﬁltering preservation. Similarly, we present our approach to the veriﬁcation of intrusion
detection monitoring preservation as well as IPsec trafﬁc protection preservation using constraint
satisfaction problem.
We derive a set of constraints that compare security conﬁgurations before and after migration.
The obtained constraints are formulated as constraint satisfaction problems and then submitted
to a SAT solver, namely Sugar [102], in order to verify security preservation properties and to
pinpoint the conﬁguration errors, if any, before the actual migration of the security context and the
virtual machine. In addition, we present case studies for the given security mechanisms in order
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Recent developments in virtualization have made cloud computing an increasingly important re-
search area. There are many IT infrastructures who are migrating into the cloud in order to beneﬁt
from this new way of delivering computing resources. Elasticity and rapid resource provision-
ing and scalability allow growth of resources in an on-demand and pay-as-you-go manner. These
features are beneﬁcial and attractive to businesses from small size to governmental organizations.
Cloud computing service model has a layer service model [35]. These services are categorized
into Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS), Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS), and Software-as-a-Service
(SaaS) [35]. IaaS refers to infrastructure such as physical servers, virtual machines and so on.
Example of IaaS provider are Amazon EC2 [8] and Rackspace Cloud [86]. PaaS on the other
hand, refers to operating systems that provide hosting and enable deployment of applications. An
example of PaaS is Google App Engine [42]. In addition, SaaS refers to the applications that run
on top of the other service layers for example Microsoft Ofﬁce 365 [70].
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1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
In spite of its drastic advantages, cloud computing has also speciﬁc security challenges [39]. Vir-
tualization enables a dynamic computing infrastructure supporting the elastic nature of service
provisioning and de-provisioning as requested by users while maintaining high levels of relia-
bility and security [65]. In this setting, Virtual Machines (VMs) are software implementations
created within a virtualization layer and their capability to be easily moved, copied, and reassigned
between host servers is a key-enabler technology that enhances load balancing, scheduled mainte-
nance, as well as power management. However, VM migration creates new security challenges in
data centers. VMs are protected using various security mechanisms including ﬁrewalls, intrusion
detection/prevention systems, etc. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrewalls are used to allow only authorized trafﬁc
to reach the protected VMs. While VMs migrate around, not only the memory and the states on
the hypervisor need to be migrated, but also the network states including ﬁrewall rules. Failing to
do so, may expose the running services on the migrated VM to security problems. These problems
are particularly important when a VM changes data center or it changes its access points. In this
latter case, there is need for modifying access rules for the ﬁrewalls. An illustrative example of this
case is ﬁrewall access control list (ACL). Assume that a VM migrates to a new location under a
different ﬁrewall conﬁguration. On one hand, if the ACLs at the new location are more permissive
than those at the original location, some packets that should be blocked might be allowed. This
may open up several security vulnerabilities to the VM. On the other hand, if they are less permis-
sive, some packets that should be allowed might be blocked. Furthermore, some virtual machine’s
running services might require speciﬁc ﬁltering rules.
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In order to ensure a secure cloud computing environment, ﬁrewalls should not be the only
line of defense. Cloud providers have to offer adequate intrusion detection/prevention systems
(IDPS) in order to monitor and alert on attacks targeting either cloud providers’ infrastructure or
the hosted VMs. Unlike in traditional data centers, IDPS systems deployed in the physical network
cannot inspect VM-to-VM trafﬁc that does not leave the physical server. Various approaches are
being proposed by research initiatives [38] and standardization bodies [7] to inspect the VM-to-
VM trafﬁc. One of the proposed approaches is to rely on a virtual security appliance within the
virtualized layer. Other VM-centric approaches propose the deployment of IDS functionalities
within each VM. Some other initiatives propose a dedicated security VM to be deployed at each
physical server with speciﬁc privileged access to the hypervisors’ APIs that plays the role of IDPS.
In this thesis, we consider an IDS architecture where a virtual appliance dedicated for intrusion
monitoring, called security monitor (SM), is attached to the hypervisors of the hosts. In addition,
we assume having a hardware-based IDS connected to the host through a network interface. In
addition to IDPS, tenants can ask for the deployment of a secure Virtual Private Network (VPN)
between their corporation networks and their networked VMs running in the cloud. This is to
enable protecting information in transit over insecure networks or leveraging the cloud services as
an extension of their corporate data centers.
Elasticity of cloud computing implies mobility, or even addition and removal (a.k.a scale up
and scale down respectively) of VMs and consequently, requires reconﬁguration of network nodes
with respect to the new architecture, including security appliances. Some research initiatives have
proposed solutions to address the implementation of dynamic reconﬁguration in the cloud. For in-
stance, an approach to automate the reconﬁguration of VPN endpoints to support WAN migration
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of VMs is proposed in [112]. In [95], a framework to control network ﬂows is proposed in order to
guarantee that network packets are being inspected by some security devices. However, dynamic
reconﬁguration is error-prone, and if not properly performed may cause security conﬁgurations in-
consistencies, thus exposing the VMs as well as the whole infrastructure to serious security threats.
Manually managing complex security rules can be time-consuming and error-prone. Furthermore,
scale and complexity of data centers are continually increasing, which makes it difﬁcult to rely
on the administrators to update and validate the security mechanisms. Therefore, a veriﬁcation
framework at the cloud management layer to verify and validate security policies in different en-
forcement points is essential as it allows the cloud provider to make sure that the same policy is
enforced after VMs migration.
1.2 Scope
In this thesis, we are mainly concerned with security issues in cloud IaaS that arise during the
migration of virtual machines, which may cause inconsistency in ﬁrewall, intrusion detection and
IPsec conﬁgurations. Migration of virtual machines, the process of transitioning VMs between
distinct physical machines, has opened new opportunities in computing. VM migration can help
in many ways such as high-availability of services, data center maintenance, transparent mobil-
ity, consolidated management, and workload balancing. While virtualization and VM migration
provide important beneﬁts, their combination may introduce new security challenges. In addition,
given the large number of security rules in modern complex networks, it is very difﬁcult to make
sure that those rules are complying with determined security policies without the help of formal
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veriﬁcation. In this thesis, we propose a veriﬁcation approach for checking the consistency of se-
curity conﬁgurations, speciﬁcally related to ﬁrewalls, intrusion detection/prevention systems and
IPsec VPNs. Our framework is based on comparing the security policy before migration with the
one that is deployed after migration. The main goal is to detect security problems, and to provide
a useful feedback to correct them before the actual migration takes place. The veriﬁcation spans
both source and destination data centers in case of cross data centers migration.
1.3 Contributions
In this thesis, we concentrate on the security issues raising due to elastic nature of cloud computing,
to be speciﬁc virtual machines migration in the cloud. The main contributions of this work are as
follows:
• We develop a formal framework called cloud calculus, which is a process algebra that en-
ables us to formally specify network topologies as well as security appliances location and
conﬁgurations. It also enables specifying the virtual machines migration along with their
security policies.
• We deﬁne the concept of ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation in dynamic cloud computing envi-
ronment, which includes ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation in source data center, destination data
center as well as the migrating virtual machine.
• We deﬁne the concepts of intrusion monitoring preservation as well as IPsec VPN trafﬁc
protection preservations in cloud data centers. The intrusion monitoring preservation in-
cludes source and destination hosts as well as migrating virtual machine. In case of IPsec
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VPN protection preservation, we cover both data centers, migrating virtual machine as well
as customer network conﬁgurations.
• We elaborate a systematic veriﬁcation approach based on Constraint Satisfaction Problem
(CSP), a well-established mathematical framework, to prove security preservation after mi-
gration for both the migrating VM, and other VMs in the involved data centers. Secu-
rity preservation includes ﬁrewall ﬁltering, intrusion monitoring, and IPsec VPN protection
preservations.
• We derive a set of formulas, which veriﬁcation enables us to conclude on security preserva-
tion, and develop a framework that describes these security preservation problems in terms
of constraint satisfaction problems based on Sugar, a SAT-based constraint solver. This ap-
proach enables cloud providers to automatically verify that each time migration takes palce,
security level of the hosted VMs (including the migrating VM) is preserved. It also helps in
detecting and correcting the conﬁguration errors if the veriﬁed properties are violated.
1.4 Thesis Organizations
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides the background information
regarding cloud computing, security mechanisms, as well as formal veriﬁcation and constraint
satisfaction. Chapter 3 provides a detailed literature review of the main areas of research that are
related to our work. Chapter 4 is dedicated to present the cloud calculus, which is a process calculus
that aims at specifying cloud topology and expressing virtual machine migration. In Chapter 5,
we detail the idea of ﬁrewall composition and we elaborate on reducing ﬁrewall conﬁguration to
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constraint satisfaction problems. Therein, we also present our approach to verify ﬁrewall ﬁltering
preservation and apply our approach on a case study to show the applicability of our approach.
Chapter 6 is dedicated to reducing IDS and IPsec conﬁgurations to constraint satisfaction problems,
and verifying intrusion monitoring preservation, as well as IPsec protection preservation. There is
also a case study to illustrate the migration of a VM in cloud data centers secured through IPsec





In this chapter, we present the background information required for understanding the remainder
of this thesis. The explanation of cloud computing given in Chapter 1 will be extended with more
technical details and clariﬁcations. Virtualization that plays a fundamental role in cloud computing,
will be explained from a technical perspective. Then, we will discuss the security mechanisms
that are used by infrastructure providers in order to make more secure cloud infrastructure and
resources. More speciﬁcally, we will discuss ﬁrewalls, intrusion detection and preventions, and
IPsec VPN. Finally, we will present some background about formal methods speciﬁcally bounded
model checking and constraint satisfaction problem. Based on them, we developed our approach
for veriﬁcation of security preservation regarding conﬁgurations of security mechanisms.
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2.1 Cloud Computing
This section presents a general overview of cloud computing, including its deﬁnition and compar-
ison with related concepts and technologies.
In this thesis, we adopt the deﬁnition of cloud computing provided by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) [76]: "Cloud computing is a model for enabling ubiquitous,
convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of conﬁgurable computing resources (e.g.,
networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released
with minimal management effort or service provider interaction". This cloud model is composed
of essential characteristics, service models, and deployment models that we will explain further
in this Chapter. Cloud computing is enabled through virtualization technology. Virtualization is a
technology that abstracts away the details of physical hardware, and provides virtualized resources
for high-level applications. A virtualized server is commonly called a virtual machine (VM).
Virtualization plays a fundamental role in cloud computing, as it provides the capability of pooling
computing resources from clusters of servers, and dynamically assigning or reassigning virtual
resources to applications on-demand.
Cloud computing shares certain aspects with some other technologies such as grid comput-
ing, and utility computing. Grid computing is a distributed computing paradigm that coordinates
networked resources to achieve a common computational objective. The motivation behind the de-
velopment of grid computing was basically scientiﬁc applications which are usually computation-
intensive. Cloud computing is similar to grid computing in that it also employs distributed re-
sources to achieve application-level objectives. However, cloud computing takes one step further
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by leveraging virtualization technologies at multiple levels (hardware and application platform)
to realize resource sharing and dynamic resource provisioning. Utility computing represents the
model of providing resources on-demand and pricing model, which is based on usage rather than
a ﬂat rate. Cloud computing can be understood as a realization of utility computing. It adopts a
utility-based pricing scheme entirely for economic reasons. With on-demand resource provision-
ing and utility-based pricing, service providers can maximize resource utilization and minimize
their operating costs.
2.1.1 Characteristics of Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is increasingly gaining ground among a variety of users including enterprises,
service providers, as well as governmental and educational entities. Cloud computing platform al-
lows hosting of multiple services on a globally shared resource pool where resources are allocated
to services on demand. Recent advances in the server virtualization technologies have improved
ﬂexibility and versatility of resource provisioning. A crucial technique that has recently emerged
for data centers and cluster systems is the live migration of virtual machines. It is basically mov-
ing a virtual machine from one physical server to another, while keeping the VM’s active network
connections such as TCP and higher layer’s sessions. This migration enables operators and admin-
istrators of the cloud to perform load balancing, workload isolation, performance, and resource
management as well as non-disruptive low-level system maintenance with no perceivable effect to
the end user. VM live migration primarily happens within the same data center but virtual machine
migration between data denters might be also required.
Besides virtual machine mobility, cloud computing provides several interesting features [66]
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that make it attractive to business owners such as:
• Multitenancy: Unlike previous computing models in which resources are dedicated to a
single user, cloud computing is based on a shared resources business model meaning that
multiple customers use the same resources at the network, host, and application levels. In
a cloud environment, different services and resources belong to multiple providers can be
located in the same data center. At the same time, responsibilities are also devided among
service providers.
• Shared resource pools: There is a pool of storage and computing resources offered by in-
frastructure providers that can be assigned to cloud customers on demand. This dynamic ca-
pability enables infrastructure providers to manage their resource usage and operating costs.
For example, an IaaS provider can take advantege of VM migration technology to get a high
degree of server consolidation, while maximizing resource utilization, and minimizing cost
in terms of power consumption and cooling.
• Service-orientation: Cloud computing utilizes a service-oriented approach with emphasis
on service management. In the cloud environment, the services from IaaS, PaaS, or SaaS
are offered according to the Service Level Agreement (SLA) that the provider and customer
have agreed upon.
• Dynamic resource provisioning: In cloud computing, resources can be granted and released
on demand. Such dynamic resource assignment is called resource provisioning. It enables
customers to use as much resources as their actual needs are and pay just for the resources
they use. When their usage drop down, then they easily release resources and pay less.
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• Scalability: Cloud computing provides the ability to scale to thousands of systems, as well
as the ability to massively scale bandwidth and storage space. In such architecture, users are
not limited to the speciﬁc number of systems as in traditional architectures.
• Elasticity: This capability allows users to scale up and down (increase and decrease) their
computing resources as required. In cloud computing, users beneﬁt very much from such
scheme as they scale up and down based on their usage and requirement over the course of
time.
• Pay-as-you-go: In cloud computing, the pricing scheme varies from service to service. No
matter which pricing scheme the providers take, users pay only for resources they actually
use and only for the time period they need them.
2.1.2 Cloud Computing Service Models
Cloud computing services are divided into three categories, according to the abstraction level of
the capability provided and the service model of providers, which are: (1) Infrastructure as a Ser-
vice (IaaS), (2) Platform as a Service (PaaS), and (3) Software as a Service (SaaS) [21]. One can
view these abstraction levels as a layered architecture. IaaS provides resources (such as storage,
computation, etc.), and resource provisioning on demand. In PaaS, developers are given the possi-
bility to build their own applications on top of the provided platforms. Developers do not need to
be concerned about the memory usage and the processing unit their applications are using. SaaS
provides the services through web portals to the end users. These online software services are
more attractive than those installed on local computers and provide the same functionalities. This
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model of delivery facilitates the process of software maintenance for customers, and testing and
development process for developers.
2.1.3 Cloud Computing Deployment Models
Cloud deployment model consists of public, private, community, and hybrid clouds. Public clouds
are those cloud environments which are publicly available to multiple tenants, while private clouds
are dedicated virtualized resources for particular organizations. In the same way, community
clouds are made for a speciﬁc groups of customers. In the case of public cloud, a cloud provider
makes resources available and offers them as pay per use model to the tenants. On the other hand,
private cloud is more secure since the control is within the organization rather than being in the
cloud provider side. However, there is downside to this setting because the organization who owns
the cloud is responsible for managing all the resources instead of passing the responsibility to a
cloud provider. A hybrid cloud consists of at least one priviate and one public cloud. It is usually
in form of a partnership. For instance, a public cloud provider forms a partnership with a company
that owns a private cloud. Therefore, an organization can use the private cloud for storing conﬁ-
dential customer data, while it can beneﬁt from an external public cloud to perform computations.
2.1.4 Network Security Challenges in Cloud Computing
Virtualization enables a dynamic computing infrastructure supporting the elastic nature of service
provisioning and de-provisioning as requested by users while maintaining high levels of reliability
and security [65]. In this setting, virtual machines (VMs) are software implementations created
within a virtualization layer and their capacity to be easily moved, copied, and reassigned between
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host servers is a key-enabler technology that enhances load balancing, scheduled maintenance,
as well as power management. However, VM migration creates new security challenges in data
centers. It is desirable to assign a permanent IP address to the VM so that when it migrates, still
keeps its IP address [73]. In addition, it is suggested that the VM migration be transparent to the
running applications. The migration of VMs not only takes place within a single data center, but
also in some cases it happens that the VMs should be moved from one data center to another.
According to [45], there are cases in which it becomes expensive to extend a particular data center.
As a result, sometimes there is need to use computing and storage resources of multiple data
centers to support a single service. For instance, there is a cloud operational strategy called follow-
the-sun [35] that shifts processing around geographicaly dispersed data centers to balance demand
proximity with low energy costs. In such cases, it is possible that at the beginning, VMs are
created in a single data center. After a while, the overhead on the physical servers in that data
center increases. Even for some reasons (e.g., hardware failure), a physical server is switched off.
As a consequence, all the VMs in that machine have to be migrated to another physical server that
could possibly be located at another data center. Here the migration between data centers becomes
a need.
VMs are protected using various security mechanisms including ﬁrewalls, intrusion detection
and prevention, IPsec VPN, etc. While VMs migrate around, not only the memory and the states
on the hypervisor need to be migrated, but also the network states including security policy. Fail-
ing to do so, may expose the running services on the migrated VM to security problems. A simple
example of this case is ﬁrewall access control lists (ACLs). Assume that a VM migrates to a new
location under a different ﬁrewall conﬁguration. On one hand, if the ACLs at the new location
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are more permissive than those at the original location, some packets that should be blocked may
be allowed. This may open up several security vulnerabilities to the VM. On the other hand, if
they are less permissive, some packets that should be allowed may be blocked. Furthermore, some
virtual machines running services might require speciﬁc ﬁltering rules. As virtual machines are dy-
namically and frequently moved between hosts, manually managing the complex ﬁrewall rules can
be time-consuming and error-prone. The similar issue arise when dealing with intrusion detection
and preventions conﬁgurations as well as IPsec VPN settings. Furthermore, scale and complexity
of data centers are continually increasing, which makes it difﬁcult to rely on the administrators to
update and validate the security mechanisms.
2.1.5 Physical vs. Virtual Security Appliances
Hypervisor is a small software application that runs either directly on top of the physical machine
hardware, or on top of a guest operating system. The ﬁrst architecture is called bare metal virtual-
ization while the later one is called hosted virtualization. The hypervisor enables virtual machines
to run on any architecture, and is responsible for isolation among them and also it manages VMs
access to hardware (e.g. CPU, memory, etc.). There are several implementations of hypervisors by
different vendors such as: Xen [113] that is the open source standard for virtualization, ESX from
VMware [111], and KVM [62] which is a linux virtualization system.
Traditional hardware security appliances such as ﬁrewalls, intrusion detection and prevention
systems are fundamental to provide the security and access control for the cloud infrastructure.
However, these appliances no longer need to be a physical piece of hardware. In addition, the
trafﬁc that is between co-located VMs normally remains at the virtual level and passes through
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virtual switches, which makes the hardware appliance blind to this type of trafﬁc. A virtual ﬁrewall
for example, can perform the same functionality as a physical ﬁrewall, but has been virtualized to
work with the hypervisor. Cisco, for example, provides a virtual ﬁrewall and security gateway
that secures host computers containing virtual machines [26]. Similarly, a virtualized intrusion
detection and prevention system can monitor trafﬁc on the virtual level and has better visibility
over the VM-to-VM trafﬁc.
Virtualized data centers rely on a hypervisor, which isolates the virtual machines from the
physical network. This creates a virtual network within the hypervisor that connects the VMs and
enables them to communicate with each other without the trafﬁc crossing the physical network. As
a result, security threats are isolated from the traditional network security tools such as intrusion
detection and prevention. Co-located VMs can communicate across the virtual switch without
having the trafﬁc pass through physical network where the security tools reside. As a consequence,
if any virtual machine is compromised, other VMs running at the same physical server will be at
risk without the security tools at the physical network have any visibility on them. In addition,
when it comes to the VM migration, if the migrating VM has been compromised or contains
malicious code, and this malicious activity has not been detected at the source location, when the
VM is migrated to another host, the destination location is at risk and could be compromised as
well. For all these reasons, the recent trend in industry as well as research communities, is to
provide different security mechanisms at the virtual level being the level of the hypervisor.
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2.2 Security Mechanisms
In this Section, we provide some background about the security mechanisms namely ﬁrewalls,
intrusion detection and prevention, and IPsec VPN. We consider in this thesis, that these security
mechanisms have been deployed by cloud IaaS providers to protect and secure the cloud resources
from attacks at the network level.
2.2.1 Firewalls
Firewalls are security mechanisms that impose restrictions on network services in such a way
that only authorized trafﬁc are allowed access, while unauthorized trafﬁc are blocked. Firewalls
are normally considered as perimeter defence because they are ﬁrst line of defence in the network
architecture. Different types of ﬁrewall technologies are available. The most basic ﬁrewall technol-
ogy is packet ﬁltering (a.k.a stateless ﬁrewall). It uses only transport layer information, and makes
the decision based on the ﬁve tupples being source IP address, destination IP address, source port,
destination port, and the protocol. It can perform trafﬁc ﬁltering with incoming or outgoing inter-
faces, which are called ingress and egress ﬁltering respectively. Packet ﬁltering does not examine
higher layer context for example matching return packets with outgoing ﬂow. On the other hand,
stateful ﬁrewalls address this need.
Stateful frewall not only examines packet information in transport layer, but also offers ad-
vanced inspection for application layer such as the packet that initializes a connection. If the in-
spected packet matches an existing ﬁrewall rule that allows it, the packet is accepted and an entry
is added to the state table. From that moment on, since the packets in that speciﬁc communication
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session match an already existing state table entry, they are allowed access without any more in-
spection in the application layer. Those packets only need to have their IP address and TCP/UDP
port number veriﬁed against the information stored in the state table to conﬁrm that they are indeed
part of the current exchange. This method will increase ﬁrewall performance because only new
packets that initiate a connection need to be unencapsulated the whole way to the application layer.
A newer technology in stateful ﬁrewalling is the addition of a stateful protocol analysis capabil-
ity, sometimes called deep packet inspection (DPI) [78]. Stateful protocol analysis improves upon
standard stateful inspection by adding basic intrusion detection technology. This allows a ﬁrewall
to accept or deny access based on how an application is running over the network. For example,
an application ﬁrewall can detect if a type of attachment in an email message is not permitted by
the organization such as ﬁles with .exe extentions, or if instant messaging (IM) is being used
over port 80, which is reserved typically for HTTP. It can also be used to allow or deny web pages
that contain particular types of active content, such as ActiveX. There are also other types of ad-
vanced ﬁrewalls including application proxy gateway, which provides a trasparent communication
between two parties however, they are actually not connected directly to each other. There is also
dedicated proxy servers that usually act as application-speciﬁc ﬁrewall such as HTTP proxy.
2.2.2 Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems
An intrusion detection system (IDS) is a system to detect intrusive activities, which normally
exploit vulnerabilities. Intrusion detection is an important security component in network security
architecture. It monitors computer and network systems in order to detect possible attacks and
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trigger alarms at the occurrence of malicious activities. They can be categorized as signature-
based intrusion detection, and anomaly-based intrusion detection. Moreover, one can classify them
as host-based intrusion detection and network-based intrusion detection systems. Signature-based
IDSs detect intrusions that match the signature of known attacks. This type of IDS is unable to
detect unknown attacks (a.k.a zero-day attacks) for which no signature is determined yet. However,
they are very effective in detecting known attacks and have low false positive rate.
On the other hand, anomaly-based IDS builds a model for normal behaviour and any violation
of that behaviour would be considered as an attack. This kind of IDS is able to detect zero-day
attacks but, it has higher false positive rate. Artiﬁcial intelligence and neural networks play impor-
tant role in the development of these types of IDS. Network-based IDSs are located at important
points in the network to monitor the network trafﬁc while, host-based IDSs run on a single host.
Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) are network security appliances that monitor
networks with intention to not only detect malicious activities and log information about them, but
also to stop those activities in order to prevent the attack. IDPS are considered extensions of in-
trusion detection systems because they have intrusion detection functionality as well as additional
prevention mechanisms such as sending an alarm, dropping the malicious packets, resetting the
connection, and blocking the trafﬁc from the malicious IP address. In this thesis, we use the term
IDS to represent a typical intrusion detection and prevention system.
2.2.3 IPSec VPN
IP security (IPsec) is a suite of protocols developed by IETF to implement security at the IP
layer [77]. IPsec is often used in order to implement Virtual Private networks (VPNs). A VPN
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is a network that uses a public telecommunication infrastructure, such as the Internet, in order to
provide secure access for users or remote ofﬁces to their organization’s network. VPN relies on
IPsec to create a tunnel between the two endpoints. The trafﬁc within the VPN tunnel is encrypted
to protect from other users of the public Internet who may intercept the communications. IPsec
provides three security functionality namely authentication, conﬁdentiality, and key management.
It can be used for instance to secure connections from a branch ofﬁce to the Internet user. In this
thesis, it could be connectivity between the corporation network and VMs deployed in the public
cloud, which enables a secure remote access. In terms of trafﬁc encryption for the conﬁdentiality,
IPsec supports two modes: transport and tunnel. Transport mode encrypts only the data portion
being the payload of the packets. Transport mode is usually used to secure end-to-end communica-
tion between two hosts. On the other hand, tunnel mode encrypts both the header and the payload.
Tunnel mode is used between two security gateways, such as ﬁrewalls or routers that implements
IPsec. At the reciever side, there will be an IPSec-compliant device, which decrypts every packet.
For IPsec to work, the sending and receiving devices must share a public key. This is accomplished
through a protocol known as Internet Key Exchange (IKE).
2.3 Formal methods
In the broad range of formal methods techniques for speciﬁcation, and veriﬁcation of software
and hardware systems, we are interested in model checking. Model checking [27] refers to the
algorithms that exhaustively explore the state space of a transition system in order to address the
following problem: Having a model of the system and a given property, whether the model meets
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that property.
Among model checking techniques, we focus on Symbolic Model Checking [19, 68], which
was introduced around 1990, and Bounded Model Checking [14] introduced in 1999. In symbolic
model checking, Bibary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) [17] are traditionally used to form a sym-
bolic representation of a system. BDDs enable a breadth ﬁrst search of the sate space, which is
effective speciﬁcally when the number of system states grows [27], but they are limited to handle
systems with hundreds of state variables. However, for larger systems there is possibility for space
explosion problem [14].
On the other hand, another type of model checking techniques is called bounded model check-
ing, that combines model checking with satisﬁability solving. Comparing to symbolic model
checking with BDDs, it does not have space explosion problem, and can handle problems with
thousands of variables [14]. Satisﬁability (often written as SAT) addresses the following problem:
Given a Boolean formula, determine if variables of that formula can be assigned in a way that
make the formula evaluate to TRUE. In that case we could say the formula is satisﬁable. If there is
no such assignment, the formula is evaluated to FALSE for every variable assignments. Therefore,
the formula is said to be unsatisﬁable. There are algorithms called SAT solvers, that can efﬁciently
solve a large subset of SAT instances.
In the following, we will present some background about bounded model checking and con-
straint satisfaction problem, based on that we develop our approach for veriﬁcation of security
preservation regarding conﬁgurations of security mechanisms.
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2.3.1 Bounded Model Checking
Bounded Model Checking (BMC), was ﬁrst introduced by Biere et al. in 1999 [14]. As exper-
iments have shown, it can solve many cases that cannot be solved by techniques that are based
on BDDs. What BMC does, is basically to search for a counterexample execution whose length
is bounded by a natural number n, and only tries to ﬁnd counter examples (paths) that consist of
no more than n transitions. In bounded model checking, a Boolean formula is constructed that
is satisﬁable if and only if there is a ﬁnite sequence of state transitions that reaches certain states
of interest. It has been shown in [13] that if the bound n is small enough (less than 80 cycles),
the SAT solver outperforms BBD-based techniquess. In fact there are classes of problems that al-
though considered hard for BDDs, in most of the cases can be solved with SAT-based techniques.
Bounded model checking consists of two phases [27]. In the ﬁrst phase, the sequential behavior
of a transition system over a ﬁnite interval is encoded as a propositional formula. In the second
phase, a propositional decision procedure, i.e., a satisﬁability solver is used to process that formula
in order to either obtain a satisfying assignment, or to prove that there is no such assignment. Each
satisfying assignment that is found can be decoded into a state sequence, which reaches states of
interest. The BMC problem can be efﬁciently reduced to a propositional satisﬁability problem, and
therefore can be solved by SAT methods rather than BDDs [13].
A propositonal formmula is a logical expression deﬁned over boolean variables [31]. An as-
signment to a set V of Boolean variables is a map σ ∶ V → {0,1}. Note that a map is an association
of an element in the range with each element in the domain. A satisfying assignment for F is
a truth assignment σ such that F evaluates to 1 under σ. We will be interested in propositional
formulas in a certain special form: F is in conjunctive normal form (CNF) if it is a conjunction (∧)
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of clauses, where each clause is a disjunction (∨) of literals, and each literal is either a variable or
its negation (¬). For example, F = (a ∨ ¬ b) ∧ (c ∨ d) is a CNF formula with four variables
and two clauses. The Boolean Satisﬁability Problem (SAT) is the following: Given a CNF formula
F , does F have a satisfying assignment? All practical satisﬁability algorithms, known as SAT
solvers, do produce such an assignment if it exists. Unlike BBD-based methods, SAT algorithms
do not suffer from the space explosion problem. Recently there has been a great advancement in
the performance of SAT solvers [31]. In fact, modern SAT solvers are able to handle propositional
satisﬁability problems with hundreds of thousands of variables or even more [13].
2.3.2 Constraint Satisfaction Problem
Constraint satisfaction is the process of ﬁnding a solution to a propositional reasoning problem that
is speciﬁed using a vector of variables that must satisfy a set of constraints. A solution is therefore
a vector of values that satisﬁes all constraints. Many problems including those of scheduling, test
generation, and veriﬁcation can be encoded in CSP. Constraint satisfaction problems are typically
identiﬁed with problems based on constraints on a ﬁnite domain. More formally, a CSP is deﬁned
by a set of variables {xi}1≤ i≤ n and a set of constraints {Cj}1≤ j≤ m. Each variable xi is deﬁned
within a domain Di of possible values. Each constraint Cj involves all or a subset of the variables
and speciﬁes the acceptable combinations of values for these variables. A state of the problem is
deﬁned by an assignment of values to some or all of the variables. A consistent or legal assignment
is one that does not violate any constraint. A complete assignment is one in which all variables
are assigned values. A solution to a CSP is a complete assignment that satisﬁes all the constraints.
There exist programs that solve CSP problems and are called constraint’s solvers. We use Sugar
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CSP solver [102], a SAT-based constraint solver based on a new SAT-encoding method named
”order encoding”. Sugar accepts Lisp-like expressions. For instance, the constraint C1 ∧ C2 is
equivalent to the expression (and C1 C2) in Sugar syntax. The complete language accepted by
Sugar can be found in [101]. After submitting a problem to Sugar, two possible conclusion are
output: either satisﬁable (denoted hereafter as SAT), if all constraints are satisﬁed or unsatisﬁable
(denoted hereafter as UNSAT), otherwise. For instance, for a conjunction of constraints c1∧⋯∧cn,
a SAT conclusion allows to infer that {ci}1≤i≤n are not disjoint whereas UNSAT conclusion asserts
that they are indeed disjoint.
An example of ﬁrewall rules encoding in Sugar syntax is shown in Figure 1. The ﬁrewall rules
are encoded using ﬁve tupples, which are protocol (pr), source and destination IP address (sip and
dip respectively), source port (ps) and destination port (pd). Since we assume the default action
is ”deny” then all the rules have ”allow” action. Therefore, we did not encode the ﬁeld action in
Sugar. However, in case when we do not consider that assumption, we can easily encode the action
ﬁeld in Sugar similarly.
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(int pr 0 255)
(int sip1 0 255) (int sip2 0 255) (int sip3 0 255) (int sip4 0 255)
(int dip1 0 255) (int dip2 0 255) (int dip3 0 255) (int dip4 0 255)
(int ps 0 65535)
(int pd 0 65535)
(or
; rule 1
( and (= pr 6) (and(>= sip1 0) (<= sip1 255)) (and(>= sip2 0) (<= sip2
255))
(and(>= sip3 0) (<= sip3 255)) (and(>= sip4 0) (<= sip4 255))
(= dip1 192) (= dip2 168) (= dip3 10) (= dip4 15)
(>= ps 0) (<= ps 65535) (= pd 80))
( and (= pr 6) (and(>= sip1 0) (<= sip1 255)) (and(>= sip2 0) (<= sip2
255))
(and(>= sip3 0) (<= sip3 255)) (and(>= sip4 0) (<= sip4 255))
(= dip1 192) (= dip2 168) (= dip3 10) (= dip4 16)
(>= ps 0) (<= ps 65535) (= pd 80))
( and (= pr 6) (and(>= sip1 0) (<= sip1 255)) (and(>= sip2 0) (<= sip2
255))
(and(>= sip3 0) (<= sip3 255)) (and(>= sip4 0) (<= sip4 255))
(= dip1 192) (= dip2 168) (= dip3 10) (= dip4 17)
(>= ps 0) (<= ps 65535) (= pd 80))
; rule 2
( and (= pr 6) (= sip1 190) (= sip2 160)
(and(>= sip3 0) (<= sip3 255)) (and(>= sip4 0) (<= sip4 255))
(= dip1 192) (= dip2 168) (= dip3 10) (= dip4 15)
(>= ps 0) (<= ps 65535) (= pd 22))
( and (= pr 6) (= sip1 190) (= sip2 160)
(and(>= sip3 0) (<= sip3 255)) (and(>= sip4 0) (<= sip4 255))
(= dip1 192) (= dip2 168) (= dip3 10) (= dip4 16)
(>= ps 0) (<= ps 65535) (= pd 22))
; end
)




In this section, we present the literature review with respect to three main axes of research that can
be connected to our work: Network security in cloud computing, analysis of security policy con-
sistency, and veriﬁcation of security policy compliance with respect to security requirements. On
one hand, policy consistency analysis initiatives focus mainly on detecting and resolving anoma-
lies and conﬂicts within a given security policy conﬁguration. On the other hand, approaches on
the veriﬁcation of policy compliance target the assessment of a security policy implementation
with respect to security requirements speciﬁed by the network administrator. In addition, we have
identiﬁed relevant research that discuss network security issues in cloud computing and presented
them brieﬂy. In the following, we will present some of the most relevant contributions in all three
research areas, but we will mainly focus on proposals aiming at security policies compliance veri-
ﬁcation, which are in the same axis as our work.
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3.1 Network Security in the Cloud
In spite of the beneﬁts elasticity brings to the cloud computing model, it may cause critical security
issues to arise particularly after VMs migration. The security challenges in dynamic cloud envi-
ronment are emphasised in [39]. The work of Subashini and Kavitha [100] presents the various
security issues of cloud computing with special attention to its service delivery models. Moreover,
co-residency of VMs in a single physical machine brings new security challenges. Research has
shown that a malicious VM can take advantage of shared access to hardware, and extract valuable
information from other VMs, which are residing in the same machine as the attacker.
In this regards, Zhang et al. [118] discuss side channel attacks when a malicious virtual ma-
chine extract information from other co-located VMs. Prior to that, Zhang et al. [117] introduced
HomeAlone, which is a system that checks for a speciﬁc tenant whether its virtual machines are
isolated from the ones of other tenants. Vaquero et al. [107] present an analysis of security issues
related to multitenancy attribute of cloud computing. They present some of the threats and solu-
tions to address these issuses provided by the literature. Jasti et al. [58] also attend to the security
issues concerning multitenancy for example scenarios when a malicious user controls a VM, and
try to gain access to other VM’s resources or try to steal the data of other users located on the same
physical machine by compromising hypervisor. In these research contributions, migration of vir-
tual machines and preservation of security is not considered as it is our primary concern. However,
similar to our work they consider security challenges in the dynamic cloud environment.
In a given data center, multiple network security mechanisms including packet ﬁlters, stateful
ﬁrewalls, IPsec and IPS/IDS are deployed in order to protect the data center resources as well as
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all the hosted VMs. As virtual machines are dynamically and frequently moved between hosts,
manually managing complex security conﬁgurations can be time consuming and error-prone. Fur-
thermore, scale and complexity of data centers are continually increasing, which makes it difﬁ-
cult to rely on the administrators to update and validate security conﬁgurations. Research initia-
tives [49, 103, 109, 114] supported by industry acknowledged the challenge and the importance
of security context migration as part of cloud elasticity mechanism. Additionally, other contri-
butions [56, 85] claim the need for automated security management tools to maintain, for in-
stance, ﬁrewall protection with dynamic virtual server migrations. Furthermore, many Internet
drafts [46, 47, 81, 110] have been published by the IETF Network Working Group in order to
investigate potential solutions for security state (context) migration. However, while these secu-
rity context migration mechanisms are needed, it is of a paramount importance to ensure that they
achieve the intended outcome. At the moment they lack the veriﬁcation for preservation of security
as we consider in this thesis.
Matthews et al. [67] propose virtual machine contracts for automating the communication and
management of VM requirements including access to a particular network segment or storage sys-
tem. Hajjat et al. [48] tackle the challenges in migrating enterprise services into hybrid cloud-based
deployments. They address the complexity of enterprise applications, and then focus on transaction
delays, wide-area communication, and cost resulted from migration. They also consider the ACL
migration and the reachability policies, and provide an algorithm for ACL migration. Although
these works draw attention to virtual machine migrations, but their focus is mainly performance
rather than security. Thus, they do not provide any formal proof for the security policy preserva-
tion.
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Some other works such as [80] draw attention to the security issues that are related to the
migration process and possibility of man-in-the-middle attacks. Huan Liu [63] presents a Denial
of Service Attack (DoS) in a cloud infrastructure and demonstrates how an attacker is able to shut
down a subnet in the cloud data center, and provides a method to avoid such attack using dynamic
provisioning capability of the cloud.
With respect to intrusion detection/prevention mechanism, a number of initiatives focused
mainly on proposing a solution to handle inspection speciﬁcally designed to the cloud. For in-
stance, [38] proposes a novel architecture for virtual machines introspection. A trade-off solution
for the deployment location of the IDS (either within the host or in the network) is proposed. Modi
et al. [71] present a survey on various intrusion detection techniques in the cloud. Roschke et
al. [91] discuss the requirements for an IDS in the cloud. They propose an IDS management archi-
tecture for distributed IDS solutions that aims at integrating and handling different types of sensors,
which collect and synthesize alerts generated from multiple hosts. In [72], another architecture for
dynamic security monitoring and enforcement targeting cloud computing is proposed. This work
is implemented using ﬁnite-state machines to increase the performance.
Azmandian et al. [9] present an approach that relies on the hypervisor-level data for detection
of intrusive activities in the virtual machine using data mining algorithms. In [105], security issues
related to the virtualization technology are reviewed, and a comparison between traditional and
modern monitoring techniques is presented along with the weaknesses as well as protection and
assurance levels. Dhage et al. [30] propose an IDS architecture to be deployed in a distributed
cloud computing environment, where separate instances are installed for each user and a single
controller is proposed to manage them.
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Amani S. Ibrahim et al. [57] present CloudSec, which is a monitoring module based on virtu-
alization technologies that performs security monitoring for virtual machines in the cloud infras-
tructure. In [6], an Intrusion Detection System as a Service (IDSaaS) is proposed. The latter is a
network and signature-based IDS for the cloud that monitors and logs network activities between
virtual machines within a pre-deﬁned Amazon Virtual Private Cloud (VPC). These research works
particularly propose new architectures and techniques for intrusion monitoring in the cloud while
do not consider security issues in terms of inconsistencies generated after migration of virtual
machines, which we tackle in this thesis.
3.2 Security Policy Consistency Analysis
An important body of research work focuses mainly on the classiﬁcation of policy anomalies and
conﬂicts as well as on the detection of these issues [1,3,5,22,24,25,32,33,41,50,54,87,89,90,108].
However, they mainly focus on packet ﬁltering stateless ﬁrewalls. Very few works considered the
analysis of stateful ﬁrewalls policies conﬂicts (e.g. [20, 29, 43]).
Al-Shaer et al. [3] proposed a classiﬁcation of policy anomalies and conﬂicts for both central-
ized and distributed ﬁrewalls architectures. Hamed and Al-Shaer [50] present a classiﬁcation of
security policy conﬂicts occurring in stateless ﬁrewalls and IPsec devices in enterprise networks.
In [32], an algorithm to automatically resolve conﬂicts between network devices is presented.
Villemaire and Halle [108] show that anomalies are spatio-temporal properties of rule-based ﬁlters
that can be expressed using the spatio-temporal language RL and then veriﬁed using RL model-
checking for anomalies detection. Capretta et al. [22] present a conﬂict detection algorithm proved
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to be correct using Coq proof system.
In [5], mechanisms to discover and resolve anomalies in a network protected by both ﬁrewalls
and intrusion detection systems are proposed. In [89, 90], Rezvani and Aryan propose a formal
language to specify security policy for ﬁrewalls for the detection of anomalies. In [54], a rule-based
segmentation technique is adopted to convert a list of rules into a set of disjoint network packet
spaces to detect anomalies. They extend this work in [55], by following a technique based on rule
segmentation, to detect policy anomalies and extract resolutions for the identiﬁed anomalies. Chen
et al. [25] present an approach based on set theory for detection of anomalies in packet ﬁltering
rule sets. Other approaches (e.g. [1, 41, 87]) propose the use of data mining techniques on log
ﬁles in order to detect ﬁrewall anomalies. In [37], a management tool implemented as a web
service, named MIRAGE, is developed for the analysis and deployment of conﬁguration policies
over network security components including stateless ﬁrewalls, intrusion detection systems, and
VPN routers. Some other works [74, 82] propose the use of process algebra and more speciﬁcally
mobile ambient [23] for the analysis and the speciﬁcation of network security policies for conﬂict
detection and analysis in single and distributed stateless ﬁrewalls.
As far as stateful ﬁrewall is concerned, only few initiatives studied the security policy consis-
tency problem of a single or distributed stateful ﬁrewalls. Unlike packet ﬁlters, the decision in a
stateful ﬁrewall on whether a packet should be allowed or blocked does not only depends on the
rules, but also on a state table that allows speciﬁc trafﬁc to be temporarily accepted as it is related
to some previously initiated authorized connections. Gouda and liu [43] propose a model of state-
ful ﬁrewalls that allows analyzing properties of stateful ﬁrewalls including conforming, grounded,
and proper. These are mainly used to verify that a stateful ﬁrewall is ”truly stateful”. The work
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of Cuppens et al. [29] is dedicated to anomalies and conﬂicts in stateful ﬁrewalls. The innovative
approach in this work is determining new conﬁguration anomalies speciﬁc to stateful ﬁrewalls that
are called intra-state rule anomalies. Algorithms to detect and resolve these anomalies were imple-
mented as part of their tool MIRAGE [37]. However, only a single stateful ﬁrewall is considered.
In [20] a technique for modeling a state as a subset of the ﬁrewall rule-set is presented. The authors
employed static analysis techniques and BDDs for detecting misconﬁgurations in ﬁrewalls.
As for IPsec policy analysis and conﬂicts detection, to best of our knowledge, there are very few
research initiatives done towards these objectives. There is a belief that VPN tunnels are created
on demand and therefore there could not be any erroneous IPSec conﬁgurations. But this is not the
case in the cloud when VMs move around. Anomalies in IPsec policy are ﬁrst studied in [34], and
a methodology is proposed to detect and resolve security policy conﬂicts in both intra-domain and
inter-domain environments. Furthermore, security requirements for IPsec are formally speciﬁed in
a high-level language. Satisfaction of all of these requirements implies the correctness of the IPsec
policy. Hamed et al. [51] model IPsec policy using ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs),
then intra-policy conﬂicts (anomalies in a single IPsec device) as well as inter-policy conﬂicts
(anomalies between multiple IPsec devices) are classiﬁed. Niksefat and Sabaei [75] extend [51]
and propose an algorithm for detecting and resolving conﬂicts in IPsec policy. In this work, binary
decision diagrams (BDDs) are used for representing IPsec policy and rules evaluations. In [60], a
data ﬂow-oriented model for detecting security conﬂicts in IPsec is proposed. In order to automate
the conﬂicts detection analysis, the model is speciﬁed in hierarchical colored Petri nets.
As we observed through studying the state of the art, important bodies of research work pro-
pose efﬁcient approaches for detecting and resolving anomalies and inconsistencies in security
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policies of stateless ﬁrewalls, whereas only few works handle stateful ﬁrewalls as well as IPsec
and intrusion detection/prevention. However, detecting and resolving anomalies are not enough to
ensure compliance of the security implementation with the speciﬁed policy. In fact, our work is
different from the above mentioned body of research in the way that we want to make sure that
there is no inconsistency in the security policy of every virtual machines including those that stay
at the source location, due to VM migration. Moreover, in the case of an elastic cloud computing
environment, we are dealing with VMs migrating from one host to another, or even one data center
to another, and there is a huge potential for security policy misconﬁguration, which can easily go
to a large scale. Therefore, relying on manual methods to check and identify possible errors is out
of question, and having an automated veriﬁcation approach is essential.
3.3 Formal Veriﬁcation of Security
In this section, ﬁrst we describe research contributions on the formal veriﬁcation of stateless ﬁre-
walls. A test case generation approach is proposed by Brucker et al. [16] for testing ﬁrewall
conﬁguration based on a formal model of ﬁrewall policies expressed in higher-order logic. Equiv-
alence checking have been investigated in [52,53,69] to verify the compliance between high-level
security policy and a ﬁrewall access control rules. In [52], high-level security policy is represented
as Access Control Matrix (ACM) based on which all possible communication paths are extracted.
ACM is then encoded to binary format and low-level ﬁrewall rules are encoded as boolean ex-
pressions. The veriﬁcation consists in the evaluation of the resulting boolean expressions. Hassan
and Hudec [53] propose to extend the latter approach using Role-Based Network Security (RBNS)
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as an intermediary model to generate low-level rules from high-level policy. Mejri et al. [69]
elaborated a formal language for stateless ﬁrewall conﬁguration speciﬁcation endowed with a de-
notational semantics. A congruence relation on ﬁrewall conﬁgurations, expressed in the proposed
language, is deﬁned that allows to formally reason about ﬁrewall conﬁguration’s compliance with
respect to a global security policy. This is performed by formally proving the soundness and the
completeness of ﬁrewall conﬁguration with respect to a security policy. The deﬁned congruence
relation is mainly used to detect inconsistencies.
Other research proposals rely on model-checking to solve the veriﬁcation problem. Al-Shaer
et al. [4] propose symbolic model checking, implemented within ConﬁgChecker tool, to verify
both network reachability and security requirements expressed as Computation Tree Logic (CTL)
properties. The network model speciﬁed as a state machine and the semantics of access control
policies are encoded as BDDs. Kotenko and Polubelova [61] propose to use SPIN model checker
for detection and resolution of ﬁltering anomalies in the speciﬁcation of security policy, where
anomalies are expressed as LTL formulas. Gouda et al. [44] propose to verify the correctness
of conﬁgurations regarding a network of stateless ﬁrewalls with tree topologies using their own
deﬁned formal model of ﬁrewall networks, namely ﬁrewall decision diagram.
Acharya and Gouda [2] demonstrated the equivalence of ﬁrewall veriﬁcation and ﬁrewall re-
dundancy checking problems for stateless ﬁrewalls and showed that any algorithm that can be used
to solve either problem can be also used to solve the other problem with the same time and space
complexities. Gawanmeh and Tahar [40] proposed an approach based on domain restriction imple-
mented in Event-B and used invariant checking to verify the consistency of ﬁrewall conﬁgurations.
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Reitblatt et al. [88] consider the issue of network conﬁguration inconsistencies due to conﬁg-
uration changes, and propose a veriﬁcation approach that guarantees preservation of well-deﬁned
behaviors when transitioning between conﬁgurations. Security policies are expressed in CTL, and
veriﬁed using model checking. In addition, Bleikertz et al. [15] address security-related challenges
encountered in virtualized infrastructures such as: zone isolation, secure migration, and absence of
single point of failure, and demonstrate how these problems can be analyzed using model check-
ing technique. When they address the issue of secure migration, they consider whether an intruder
who has enough privileges could migrate the VM through an insecure network, or to a physical
machine under his control. On the other hand, in this thesis, we consider that migration of the
VM is legitimately done, and we would like to make sure that the migration does not introduce
misconﬁguration in different security mechanisms.
Satisﬁability veriﬁcation are also investigated and proposed in some proposals [10–12, 59, 83,
115]. Jeffrey and Samak [59] use bounded model checking based on a SAT solver for the analysis
of reachability and cyclicity in a network of stateless ﬁrewall policy conﬁgurations. Reachability
means that each rule of the policy can be ﬁred by at least one packet, whereas cyclicity means
there is a packet that causes the ﬁrewall to enter an inﬁnite loop, without accepting or rejecting the
packet. Ben Youssef et al. [10] propose an automated approach for veriﬁcation of the conformance
of a distributed ﬁrewall conﬁguration to a predeﬁned security policy based on Satisﬁability Modulo
Theories (SMT) technique. Their approach detects conﬂicts within the security policy, and returns
key elements for the correction of ﬂawed ﬁrewall conﬁgurations.
Finally, few works [83,115] consider constraint satisfaction problems (CSP) to solve the prob-
lem of stateless ﬁrewall rules compliance with a security policy. Both works consider translating
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the security policy and the ﬁrewall rules into CSPs in order to detect compliance or violation of
pre-deﬁned security requirements. In contrast to these works, we do not compare a security im-
plementation with a security policy, but we compare the current security conﬁguration with the
last known secure conﬁguration, which will be shown to be well-suited for frequently changing
environments. Both [83,115] consider a single stateless ﬁrewall rules, whereas we support a more
complicated case with distributed stateless ﬁrewalls. Zhang et al. [116] propose a technique based
on Booleans satisﬁability in order to compare two ﬁrewall conﬁgurations, and verify whether they
are equal or one is included in the other. They present a method for ﬁrewall synthesis using
Quantiﬁed Boolean Formula (QBF) solver. In this work, the case of having stateful ﬁrewall is
not considered. Bera et al. [12] propose a framework based on Quantiﬁed Boolean Satisﬁability
Checking (QSAT) problem in order to verify the enforcement of security policy in terms of ACL
rules that are distributed across network interfaces.
With respect to intrusion detection/prevention, few works [94, 104] propose model checking
techniques to model and analyze IDS conﬁgurations. Ben Tekaya et al. [104] employed a formal
veriﬁcation technique based on model checking of temporal logic formulas to verify the correctness
of the intrusion detection system using the SMV model checker. The properties are either veriﬁed
if the behavior is normal, or violated if the behavior is intrusive. In [94] a model checking veriﬁca-
tion approach is presented to detect speciﬁcation errors in attack signatures of intrusion detection.
The attack signatures are transformed to PROMELA [84], and the model-checker SPIN [98] is
used for the veriﬁcation. Uribe et al. [106] propose an approach for modeling and reasoning about
the conﬁgurations of a combination of network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) and ﬁrewalls.
They employed constraint logic programming to model the network as well as NIDS and ﬁrewall
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conﬁgurations. The approach can be applied to generate NIDS conﬁgurations from event speciﬁ-
cations, and to detect multi-step attacks. A tool is implemented that is able to process Cisco PIX
ﬁrewall rules, and analyze abstract NIDS conﬁgurations to determine whether a detection policy is
enforced or not.
Song et al. [97] propose a formal framework for the analysis of intrusion detection systems
that employs declarative rules for attack recognition. The main goal of this framework is to reason
about the effectiveness of an IDS, therefore to prove that a given IDS can detect all attacks that
would violate security requirements of a given system. Couture et al. [28] present an intrusion
detection technique based on temporal logics. The proposed logic can express timing, safety, and
repetition properties useful to address stateful intrusion detection. Stakhanova et al. [99] present
a framework for the analysis of host-based and network-based intrusion detection systems for the
purpose of conﬂict detection in the rule-sets. In [92] a framework based on Event Calculus (EC) for
formal analysis of intrusion detection systems is presented. This framework checks that security
requirements are preserved at run-time by monitoring the satisfaction of the corresponding EC
formulas. This is done by observing the network at run-time, and checking observations against
speciﬁed network behavior.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no work tackling the veriﬁcation of stateful ﬁrewalls, as
well as IPsec VPN conﬁguration. In addition, most of the existing proposals addressing compliance
veriﬁcation of security policies, successfully compare a given security conﬁguration implementa-
tion against a set of security requirements. However, in a scenario where VMs have to migrate
frequently and promptly, such an approach can become a real bottleneck if not appropriately tai-
lored to such a fast changing environment. For instance, applying such an approach means that
37
any time a migration occurs, one has to consider each single security requirement of the co-located
VMs in the updated data centers in addition to the requirements of the migrating VM. In contrast
to these methodologies, we propose to divide the problem into two main sub-problems: veriﬁca-
tion of security of the migrating VM, and veriﬁcation of security of the non-migrating VMs all
together. Therefore, we can verify the security of all non-migrating VMs at once, which acceler-
ate the process. To this end, we propose to compare the new security conﬁguration with the "last




In this chapter, we aim at providing a formal framework to express and verify the VM deployment
and migration process in the cloud from the security point of view. More precisely, we propose a
framework that allows expressing the deployment and migration of VMs along with their related
security policies, and then verifying the preservation of the security after migration. This thesis
is the ﬁrst initiative that employs a process algebraic approach for this matter. The majority of
existing research initiatives mainly focus on performance evaluation, downtime, and cost analysis
of virtual machines migration process.
Cloud calculus is a process algebra that aims at specifying cloud topology, and expressing
virtual machines migration within the same as well as across data centers along with their corre-
sponding security policies. Cloud calculus is built upon a subset of the Mobile Ambients (MA) [23]
and the Non-interfering Boxed Ambients [18], and extends them with new constructs. These con-
structs allow expressing speciﬁc sort of ambients, such as security ambient and packet ambient,
in addition to security policies at speciﬁc locations in the network, the selection of those policies
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that need to be migrated with their corresponding VMs, and the update of the destination location
with the new policies. The choice of the ambient concept as a foundation for the cloud calculus is
justiﬁed as it was successfully used by other researchers to represent a network as a graph of nested
nodes (e.g. [79]). Ambients allow representing any type of resources including ﬁrewalls, switches,
routers, gateways, physical hosts, and VMs. Particularly, MA calculus is based on the concepts of
hierarchy and grouping, which allows to fully represent the topology of a network. Furthermore,
ambients have capabilities of moving around and communicating with other ambients.
4.0.1 Syntax
The cloud calculus comprises six syntactic categories: terms T , processes P , capabilities M , ﬁre-
wall policies G, ambient names A, and locations η. In the following, we brieﬂy explain each
construct. Ambient names can be a ﬁxed name n or a variable u. Locations η are used to indicate
where the communications take place: either locally within the same ambient, or across ambient
boundaries (between a parent and a child). The location means towards the parent, the locationA
means towards the sub-ambient named A, and↭ (generally omitted) means local communication.
Terms enable us to specify the type of data that can be communicated between ambients. A term
T can be a capability M , an ambient A, a security policy G, or a variable x. The syntax of cloud
calculus is provided in Figure 2 and Figure 3. In the following we detail the constructs related to
processes, capabilities, and security policies.
A process can be deﬁned using the following constructors:
• The process 0 represents the inactive process, that does nothing.
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Terms







T ) function application
Locations




P,Q ∶ ∶= 0 inactivity
∣ (νn)P restriction
∣ P | Q composition
∣ !P replication
∣ M.P capability
∣ A[P ] ambient
∣ h▷A[P ] packet ambient






M,N ∶ ∶=  empty path
∣ x variable
∣ in A enter A
∣ out A exit A
∣ M.N path
∣ ↓ (x,A,A′) export rules
∣ ↑ (G) import rules
Ambients Names
A ∶ ∶= u variable
∣ n name
Figure 2: Syntax of the Cloud Calculus - Part1
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Packet Header
h ∶ ∶= ⟨prot, A, val, A, val⟩
Firewall Rules
G ∶ ∶= nop ∣ (c↦ d).G
c ∶ ∶= ⟨prot, add, port, add, port⟩
d ∶ ∶= Allow ∣ Deny
prot ∶ ∶= tcp ∣ udp ∣ icmp ∣ *
add ∶ ∶= * ∣ subnet ∣ ip
port ∶ ∶= * ∣ pval ∣ pval .. pval
ip ∶ ∶= val.val.val.val
subnet ∶ ∶= ip/cidr
val ∈ [0,255]
pval ∈ [0,65535]
Figure 3: Syntax of the Cloud Calculus - Part 2
• The process (νn)P denotes the restriction operator that creates a new (unique) name n
within the scope P . It can be used to name ambients and operate on ambients by name.
• The process P | Q: denotes the parallel composition of two processes P and Q.
• !P : represents the unbounded replication of the process P that allows deﬁning iteration and
recursion.
• G ∶∶ A[P ]: denotes an (security) ambient named A containing a running process P , and
protected by a security policy deﬁned in G.
• h▷A[P ]: is the packet ambient named A that possesses a header h, and contains a running
process P . The entity h denotes a ﬁve tuple consisting of protocol, source ambient, source
port, destination ambient, and destination port.
• M.P : is the process that executes a capability M , and then continues as P .
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• (x)η.P : is the anonymous polyadic input of values that is a binder of the variable x with
continuation P .
• ⟨T ⟩η .P : is the anonymous polyadic output of T .
Capabilities are obtained from names or variables. They can be described as follows:
• x: denotes a capability variable.
• in A: is the capability to enter into an ambient A,
• out A: is the capability to exit an ambient A,
• M.N : is a composition of capabilities forming a path,
• : denotes the empty path,
• ↓ (x,A,A′): allows exporting security policies of the enclosing ambient that speciﬁcally
concerns the ambient A and bound it into the variable x. The ambient A′ represents the
destination security ambient.
• ↑ (G): allows importing security policies G into the enclosing ambient.
A security policy denoted by G represents a sequence of rules deﬁning constrains on the mo-
bility of ambients and on the communication between them. Security policies can be expressed as
follows:
• nop: denotes the empty security policy.
43
• (c↦ d).G denotes a sequence of access control rules. A given access control rule is deﬁned
by the tuple c and the decision d (either allow or deny). The tuple c is formed by the pro-
tocol prot, the source ambient represented by an IP value or a range add, the source port
represented by a port number value or a range port, the destination ambient add, and the
destination port port. Note that, in practice, the name of an ambient corresponds to an IP
address.
The free names and free variables, noted fn() and fv() respectively, have standard deﬁnitions,
and will not be detailed here. The notation P [T /x] denotes the free substitution deﬁned only if T
and x are of the same arity. A closed process contains no free variable. We also omit the inactivity
0 in process expression such as P ∣ 0 and M.0.
4.0.2 Operational Semantics
The operational semantics is deﬁned in terms of reduction and structural congruence. The struc-
tural congruence, noted ≡, is the least congruence that satisﬁes the laws in Figure 4.
Before presenting the cloud reduction rules, we present two auxiliary sub-reductions, namely
→ev and →exp. First one is needed for evaluation of the security policy G while having a packet
ambient with a header h trying to move from a source to a destination. The second sub-reduction is
needed for determining the rules to be exported to the new destination ambient given the name of
the migrating ambient A and the destination ambient A′. Given a sequence of ﬁrewall rules G, we
deﬁne the auxiliary function ev that evaluates G in the sequential order. We deﬁne ⟦c⟧(h) as the
evaluation of the tuple c of a speciﬁc rule (c ↦ d) against the values in the tuple h. The function
⟦c⟧(h) returns true if the header h matches c, and returns false otherwise. Figure 5 illustrates
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MONOID
P ∣0 ≡ P
P ∣Q ≡ Q∣P
P ∣(Q∣R) ≡ (P ∣Q)∣R
REPL




(νn)(νm)P ≡ (νm)(νn)P n ≠m
RES PAR




(νn)m[P ] ≡m[(νn)P ] n ≠m
RES SEC AMB
(νn)G ∶∶m[P ] ≡ G ∶∶m[(νn)P ] n ≠m
RES PCKT AMB
(νn)h▷m[P ] ≡ h▷m[(νn)P ] n ≠m
SEC AMB
nop ∶∶ n[P ] ≡ n[P ]
Figure 4: Structural Congruence
the reduction rules for →ev. Rule SEQ allows to evaluate the ﬁrewall rules in the sequential order.
Rule MATCH is used when the currently evaluated ﬁrewall rule matches with h and has a decision
d. Rule NEXT is used when the currently evaluated ﬁrewall rule doesn’t match with h. Finally, rule
NONE is used when we reach the end of the ﬁrewall rules sequence with no match. We denote by
⇓ev the reduction to normal form of the expression h ⊩ ev(G).
In order to select the ﬁrewall rules corresponding to a migrating ambient A, we deﬁne an
auxiliary function exp that processes each ﬁrewall rule and decides either to completely move
(Rule MOVE) the rule, to copy (Rule COPY) the rule, or to do nothing (Rule NEXT). Rule SEQ and
LAST are used to process the security rules in sequential order, and to evaluate the last ﬁrewall rule
45
SEQ h ⊩ ev((c↦ d).G) →ev ev((c↦ d)).G
MATCH h ⊩ ev((c↦ d)).G →ev d
if ⟦c⟧(h) = true
NEXT h ⊩ ev((c↦ d)).G →ev ev(G)
if ⟦c⟧(h) = false
NONE h ⊩ ev(nop) →ev Deny
Figure 5: Reduction Rules for Firewall Rules Evaluation
respectively. Note that we have to copy a ﬁrewall rule when the rule concerns more than one VM
such that c integrates c′ and c′′, written c = c′ + c′′. We deﬁne a set of ﬁve projection functions,
denoted by π5i , that takes a tuple c and returns the ith element of the tuple. The function Sub(n,n’)
returns true if n is a sub-ambient of n′ and false otherwise. Figure 6 provides the reduction rules
for→exp. We denote by ⇓exp the reduction to normal form of the expressionA′,A ⊩ anglebarexp(G), nopanglebar,
where A is the migrating ambient, and A′ is the destination ﬁrewall. The normal form is of the
form anglebarG,G′anglebar, where G′ are the rules to be migrated and G are the rules that remain within the
enclosing ambient.
SEQ A′,A ⊩ anglebarexp((c↦ d).G), Ganglebar →exp anglebarexp((c↦ d)).G, Ganglebar
MOVE A′,A ⊩ anglebarexp((c↦ d)).G, Ganglebar →exp anglebarexp(G), (c↦ d).Ganglebar
if (π2(c) = A and Sub(π4(c),A′) ) or (π4(c) = A and Sub(π2(c),A′))
COPY A′,A ⊩ anglebarexp((c↦ d)).G, Ganglebar →exp anglebar(c′′ ↦ d).exp(G), (c′ ↦ d).Ganglebar
if [d = Allow and ( (π2(c) = A and !Sub(π4(c),A′) ) or
(π4(c) = A and !Sub(π2(c),A′) ) or (A ⊂ π2(c) ∪ π4(c)))] where c′ + c′′ = c
NEXT A′,A ⊩ anglebarexp((c↦ d)).G, Ganglebar →exp anglebar(c↦ d).exp(G),Ganglebar
if (A ⊈ π2(c) and A ⊈ π4(c)) or
(d =Deny and (A ⊂ π2(c) or A ⊂ π4(c)) or
(d =Deny and A = π2(c) and !Sub(π4(c),A′) ) or
(d =Deny and A = π4(c) and !Sub(π2(c),A′) ))
LAST A′,A ⊩ anglebarG.exp(nop), Ganglebar →exp anglebarG,Ganglebar
Figure 6: Reduction Rules for Firewall Rules Export
The cloud calculus reduction relation uses the two aforementioned sub-reductions and it is
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deﬁned by the rules for mobility, communication, ﬁrewall rules manipulation, and structural rules
given in Figure 7. Therein, contexts are processes with one hole deﬁned as follows:
C[⋅] ∶ ∶= [⋅] ∣ P ∣C[⋅] ∣ (νn)C[⋅] ∣ G ∶∶ A[C[⋅]] ∣ h▷A[C[⋅]]
The reduction relation →∗ denotes the reﬂexive and transitive closure of →. In the following, we
explain the reduction rules:
• Rule (ENTER) allows a (non-packet) ambient n containing the process in m.P to enter a
sibling ambient m. If no sibling m exists, the operation blocks until a time when such a
sibling exists. If more than one m sibling exists, any one of them can be chosen.
• Rules (ENTER ALLOW) and (ENTER DENY) are used with a packet ambient p containing a
process in m.P that is willing to enter m, a sibling security ambient containing the ﬁrewall
rules Gm. The ﬁrst rule applies if there is a ﬁrewall rule with decision allow that matches
with h, which results in the packet p entering the ambientm. The second rule applies if there
is either a matching security rule with decision deny or no matching rule at all, which results
in dropping the packet ambient p.
• Rule (EXIT) is used to allow a (non-packet) ambient n containing the process out m.P to
exit a parent ambient m. If the parent ambient is not named m, the operation blocks until
such a condition holds.
• Rule (EXIT ALLOW) and (EXIT DENY) are used with a packet ambient p containing a process
out m.P that is willing to exit m, a parent security ambient containing the ﬁrewall rules Gm.
The ﬁrst rule applies if there is a ﬁrewall rule with decision allow that matches with h, which
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results in the packet p exiting the ambient m. The second rule applies if there is either
a matching security rule with decision deny, or no matching rule at all, which results in
dropping the packet ambient p.
• Rule (LOCAL) allows a local communication between a local input of x and a local output T
within the same ambient to take place. This results in the substitution of all occurrences of
variable x in P with the value T .
• Rule (INPUT n) allows a communication between a parent and its child by an output of T
from a child ambient n, and an input of x from its parent ambient.
• Rule (OUTPUT n) allows a communication between a parent and its child by an output of T
from a parent ambient, and an input of x from its child ambient n.
• Rule (IMPORT) deﬁnes an import operation (dual of export) of a sequence of ﬁrewall rules
G′ to a security ambient n. We deﬁne an auxiliary function Merge that allows to merge two
sequences of ﬁrewall rules such that G′n=Merge(Gn,G′) represents the new ﬁrewall rules
sequence of n.
• Rule (EXPORT) deﬁnes an export operation of a sequence of ﬁrewall rules G′ that are related
to a migrating virtual machine m, and having as destination a security ambient m′. This
results in the substitution of all occurrences of variable x in P with the value G′.
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Mobility:
(ENTER) Gn ∶∶ n[in m.P ∣ Q] ∣ Gm ∶∶m[R] → Gm ∶∶m[Gn ∶∶ n[P ∣ Q] ∣ R]
(ENTER ALLOW)
h ⊩ ev(Gm) ⇓ev Allow
h▷ p[in m.P ] ∣ Gm ∶∶m[Q] 
→ Gm ∶∶m[h▷ p[P ] ∣ Q]
(ENTER DENY)
h ⊩ ev(Gm) ⇓ev Deny
h▷ p[in m.P ] ∣ Gm ∶∶m[Q] 
→ Gm ∶∶m[Q]
(EXIT) Gn ∶∶ n[Gm ∶∶m[out n.P ∣ Q] ∣ R] → Gm ∶∶m[P ∣ Q] ∣ Gn ∶∶ n[R]
(EXIT ALLOW)
h ⊩ ev(Gm) ⇓ev Allow
Gm ∶∶m[h▷ p[in m.P ] ∣∣ Q] 
→ h▷ p[in m.P ] ∣Gm ∶∶m[Q]
(EXIT DENY)
h ⊩ ev(Gm) ⇓ev Deny
Gm ∶∶m[h▷ p[in m.P ] ∣ Q] 
→ Gm ∶∶m[Q]
Communication:
(LOCAL) (x).P | ⟨T ⟩ .Q → P{T /x} | Q
(INPUT n) (x)n.P | Gn ∶∶ n[⟨T ⟩

.Q ∣ R] → P{T /x} | Gn ∶∶ n[Q ∣ R]




Gn ∶∶ n[↑ (G′).P ] → G′n ∶∶ n[P ]
(EXPORT)
m′,m ⊩ anglebarexp(Gn), Ganglebar ⇓exp anglebarG′n, G′anglebar




P ≡ P ′ P ′ 




→ Q ⇒ C[P ] 
→ C[Q]
Figure 7: Cloud Calculus Reduction Rules
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4.1 Security Mechanisms Syntax
In this section, we present the cloud calculus syntax regarding stateless ﬁrewall, IDS, and IPsec
security mechanisms.
4.1.1 Stateless Firewall Syntax
The syntax of a ﬁrewall conﬁguration language in BNF is presented in Figure 8.
Firewall Conﬁguration Rule Predicate
F ∶ ∶= {m ∶ L,⋯, m ∶ L} multiple ACL p ∶ ∶= sip  add source addr
L ∶ ∶= nop empty ∣ ps  port source port
∣ (p ↦ d).L sequence ∣ dip  add destination addr
d ∶ ∶= allow allow decision ∣ pd  port destination port
∣ deny deny decision ∣ pr = prot protocol
∣ Jump m link to ACL m ∣ p ∧ p conjunction
ip ∶ ∶= val.val.val.val add ∶ ∶= *
subnet ∶ ∶= ip/cidr ∣ subnet
val ∈ [0,255] ∣ ip
pval ∈ [0,65535] port ∶ ∶= *
prot ∶ ∶= tcp ∣ udp ∣ * ∣ pval
 ∈ {=,⊂} ∣ pval .. pval
Figure 8: Firewall Syntax
The symbol *, depending on its position, denotes the range of possible values in terms of IP,
port, or protocol. A ﬁrewall conﬁguration F can be composed of a number of ACLs L. For a given
category of ﬁrewalls, the conﬁguration language, rules’ organization, and the interaction between
multiple ACLs are the main variation factors between ﬁrewalls from different vendors. An ACL,
denoted by L, is associated with a name m. The latter allows naming ACLs in order to link an
ACL to another using the construct Jump m. The ﬁrewall rules in a given ACL are organized in
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sequential order. Let fi be a single ﬁrewall rule, denoted by pi ↦ di where pi is a predicate repre-
senting the ﬁltering condition of the rule, and di is the corresponding decision. The predicate pi is
the conjunction of the set of predicates on the proceeded packet’s attributes. The commonly used
attributes in the packet header are the protocol, the source IP address, the destination IP address,
the source port number, and the destination port number. For instance, the topology of the data
center DC1 depicted in Figure 9 can be expressed using cloud calculus as follows:
D1 = F1 ∶∶ G1[ F2 ∶∶ S1[ S3[ PS1[PWEB1] ] ] ∣ P ]
where P = F3 ∶∶ S2[ S3 ∣ S4[ PS2[PAP1] ] ] and PWEB1 = VM5 ∣ VM6 ∣ VM7
The topology of the data center DC2 can be expressed as follows:
D2 = F4 ∶∶ G2[ F5 ∶∶ S5[ S6[ PS3[PDB1] ∣ PS4[VM1 ∣ VM2 ∣ VM3 ∣ VM4]] ]]
The cloud calculus operational semantics is deﬁned in terms of reduction rules and structural con-
gruence. Firewall rules migration can be described using the cloud calculus reduction rules.
4.1.2 IDS Syntax
IDS rules differ from one intrusion detection system to another. In our case, we consider Snort [96]
intrusion detection system, which is an open source IDS that is widely deployed in many networks.
The syntax of an intrusion detection conﬁguration language in BNF is presented in Figure 10.
The proposed syntax allows us to express IDS in cloud calculus. The bit-length of the allocated
network preﬁx is denoted by cidr, which represents Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) that is
a method for specifying IP addresses and their associated routing preﬁx. The symbol *, depending
on its position, denotes the range of possible values in terms of IP, port, or protocol. An intrusion

































Figure 9: Cloud Network Model
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where prd is a predicate over packets attributes (i.e. protocol, source and destination address,
source and destination port), and the direction of the communication denoted by dr, and the Snort
rule’s option opt which represents the content identifying the signature of the attack.
IDS Conﬁguration Rule Predicate
I ∶ ∶= nop empty prd ∶ ∶= pr = prot protocol
∣ (prd ↦ act).I sequence ∣ sip  add source addr
act ∶ ∶= alert alert ∣ ps  port source port
∣ log log ∣ dr = dir direction
∣ pass pass ∣ dip  add destination addr
∣ pd  port destination port
∣ opt = option rule options
∣ prd ∧ prd conjunction
ip ∶ ∶= val.val.val.val add ∶ ∶= *
subnet ∶ ∶= ip/cidr ∣ subnet
val ∈ [0,255] ∣ ip
pval ∈ [0,65535] port ∶ ∶= *
prot ∶ ∶= tcp ∣ udp ∣ icmp ∣ ip ∣ * ∣ pval
dir ∈ {→,↔} ∣ pval .. pval
 ∈ {=,⊂}
Figure 10: IDS Syntax
4.1.3 IPsec Syntax
The syntax related to IPsec VPN conﬁgurations is illustrated in Figure 11. An IPsec conﬁguration,
denoted by E, is a sequence of ACL rules p ↦ dp so that dp represents the action and encryp-
tion parameters for the protected trafﬁc. The predicate p is the condition on the packet’s header
attributes, and it mainly includes source and destination IP addresses with source and destination
ports as well as the protocol. Three actions dp are possible: deny, bypass, or protect. In the case of
action ”protect”, speciﬁc transforms are speciﬁed to be applied on the trafﬁc matching p. An IPsec
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transform te is any cryptographic service that can be used to protect network trafﬁc. A transform is
composed of a security service sec_prot, that is either IPsec AH and ESP protocols and operating
either in transport or tunnel mode denoted by mode along with the cryptographic algorithm and
the necessary cryptographic parameters speciﬁed by param.
IPsec Conﬁguration
E ∶ ∶= nop empty
∣ (p ↦ dp).E sequence
dp ∶ ∶= protect te secure
∣ bypass insecure
∣ discard drop trafﬁc
te ∶ ∶= (sec_prot,mode, param)
sec_prot ∶ ∶= AH
∣ ESP
mode ∶ ∶= Transport
∣ Tunnel ip
param ∈ {3DES,⋯}
Figure 11: IPsec Syntax
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Chapter 5
Stateless Firewalls Filtering Preservation
In this chapter, ﬁrst we present distributed ﬁrewalls composition which enable us to consider archi-
tecture with more than one ﬁrewalls. Then, we show how we encode a single ﬁrewall as well as a
distributed ﬁrewalls conﬁguration in constraint satisfaction problem (CSP). After that, we present
our veriﬁcation approach for ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation in dynamic cloud computing environ-
ment. We present ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation concept, and then we formally deﬁne ﬁrewall
ﬁltering preservation in source and destination data centers as well as for the migrating VM. After-
ward, we elaborate on the CSP constrains which satisﬁabilities allow verifying the deﬁned ﬁrewall
ﬁltering preservation. Finally, we describe the proposed veriﬁcation procedure, and explain the
interpretation of the outcome of Sugar solver by demonstrating a case study.
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5.1 Firewall Composition
In the case of a well-engineered network with distributed ﬁrewalls, multiple paths may exist to
reach a given destination, and dynamic routing is used in order to improve performance and relia-
bility. Packets crossing different paths may be processed by different ﬁrewalls rules. Consequently,
a packet could traverse different ACL at different times. In this section, we deﬁne a language to
express distributed ﬁrewalls composition, denoted by T . Two ﬁrewalls may be either composed in
serial or in parallel. The syntax of T is provided in BNF as follows:
T ∶ ∶= F ∣ T ⊙ T ∣ T ⊕ T
where F is a single ﬁrewall conﬁguration, T1 ⊙ T2 denotes serial composition of T1 and T2, and
T1 ⊕T2 is the parallel composition of two ﬁrewall conﬁgurations T1 and T2. In serial composition,
T1 ⊙ T2 means that a packet that survives ﬁltering of rules of T1 is then necessarily ﬁltered by
T2. The operator ⊙ is associative and distributive over ⊕. With respect to parallel composition,
T1 ⊕ T2 means that a packet is either ﬁltered by T1 or by T2. The operator ⊕ is commutative and
associative. The parallel ﬁrewalling operation is useful for better high availability. In this case if
one of the links goes down, the second is used to carry the trafﬁc to the destination.
Given a cloud calculus term expressing the topology of a cloud data center, one can deﬁne a
function that parses the expression in order to infer the resulting ﬁrewalls composition expressed
in the above syntax. Thus, we denote by P such a function that takes as input a cloud calculus term
and an ambient name A and returns the ﬁrewall composition expression.
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5.2 Encoding Firewall Conﬁguration in CSP
In the following, we present how we encode a single ﬁrewall, and then a distributed ﬁrewall con-
ﬁguration in CSP. The CSP variables are the set of integer variables V needed to encode the
condition ﬁlters of a given ﬁrewall rule. In order to represent an IP address, 4 integer variables
within the range of [0,255] are used. A source (resp. destination) IP address is represented by
{sipi}1≤i≤4 (resp. {dipi}1≤i≤4). The integer variable pr ∈ [0,255] represents the protocol num-
ber. We also deﬁne two integer variables to encode the source and destination port numbers,
respectively ps and pd within the range of values [0,65535]. Thus, the set of integer variables is
V = {pr, sip1, sip2, sip3, sip4, ps, dip1, dip2, dip3, dip4, pd}.
In the syntax of CSP for Sugar constraint solver, declaring an integer variable for instance
pr within the range [0,255] is denoted by (int pr 0 255). Each single ﬁrewall rule predicate p
is encoded as a CSP constraint. It is a conjunctive logical formula over the variables in V . The
corresponding CSP constraint is written as: pr = v1 ∧ sip1 = v2 ∧ sip2 = v3 ⋯ ∧ dip4 =
v10 ∧ pd = v11 where vi is to be replaced by the actual value in the corresponding ﬁrewall rule.
The ﬁrewall ACL is encoded as a constraint C built as a disjunctive logical formula over all ﬁrewall
rules formulas. Thus, the ordered sequence of ﬁrewall rules (pn → dn).(pn−1 → dn−1). ⋯ .nop are
encoded as the logical formula p1 ∨p2 ∨⋯∨pn. In Sugar syntax, this is denoted by (or p1 . . . pn ).
Since we consider that all rules have ”allow” decisions, this constraint represents the set of
packets accepted by the ﬁrewall conﬁguration. Sugar parses C and returns satisﬁable with a com-
plete assignment solution of the problem, which is a packet that matches one of the ﬁrewall rules
predicate. A !C represents the set of packets denied by the ﬁrewall conﬁguration. With respect to
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distributed ﬁrewalls, we consider each possible path to the migrating VM in source and destination
data centers. Given the cloud calculus term, one can infer the ﬁrewall composition of the data
center topology expressed in the syntax deﬁned in Section 5.1. Therein, paths are composed using
the ⊕ operator, i.e. P1⊕⋯⊕Pn, where Pi consists of the serial composition of k ﬁrewalls, denoted
by F1 ⊙⋯⊙ Fk.
5.3 Approach
In this section, we present our approach to verify ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation in dynamic cloud
computing environment. First, we present ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation concept and summarize
our assumptions. Then, we formally deﬁne ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation in source and destination
data centers as well as for a migrating VM. Afterward, we elaborate on the CSP constrains, which
satisﬁabilities allow verifying the deﬁned ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation. Finally, we describe the
proposed veriﬁcation procedure, and explain the interpretation of the outcome of Sugar constraint
solver.
In dynamic cloud computing environment, a virtual machine may leave a data centerD1, called
source data center, to be relocated in another data center D2, called destination data center. During
migration, the security enforcement rules located initially in D1 should follow the VM. Thus, they
have to be removed from the source data center, and then reinforced at the destination data center.
Thus, it is very important to ensure each time, that the migrating VM ﬁrewall ﬁltering requirements
have not been compromised. Furthermore, as this involves modiﬁcation of ﬁrewall ﬁltering rules in
both source and destination data centers, we also have to ensure that ﬁrewall ﬁltering requirements
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of the non-migrating virtual machines located therein have not been compromised. We suppose
that all ﬁrewalls are anomaly-free, and decisions of all the rules are of type ”allow” and the default
one is a ”deny” rule. Although, in case of existence of both deny and allow rules, one can use
the algorithm deﬁned in [64], which computes the effective representation of the ﬁrewall rules
consisting of the equivalent allow rules. Furthermore, we assume the initial conﬁgurations before
migration in both data centers are compliant with the pre-deﬁned security policy.
5.3.1 Firewall Filtering Preservation
In the following, we formally deﬁne ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation in dynamic cloud computing
environment. Let Absrc, Aasrc, Av be the accepted trafﬁc in the source data center before migration,
the accepted trafﬁc in the source data center after migration, and the accepted trafﬁc destined to the
migrating VM v, respectively. Intuitively, ﬁrewall ﬁltering is preserved in the source data center if
the only difference between trafﬁc accepted before and after migration is the one destined to the
migrating VM v. This is deﬁned formally as follows:
Deﬁnition 5.3.1. Firewall Filtering Preservation in Source Data Center
Firewall ﬁltering is preserved in source data center if and only if for any path, we have Aasrc =
Absrc ∖Av and Av ≠ ∅.
Note here that we requireAv ≠ ∅ otherwise, this will be a trivial case where no rule is migrated.
In the destination data center, ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 5.3.2. Firewall Filtering Preservation in Destination Data Center
Firewall ﬁltering is preserved in destination data center if and only if for any path, we have Abdst =
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Aadst ∖Av and Av ≠ ∅.
Since we are assuming that ﬁrewall ﬁltering requirements of the migrating VM are met in
the source data center, its ﬁrewall ﬁltering is preserved if the trafﬁc accepted to that VM in the
destination data center after migration and the source data center before migration are equal.
Deﬁnition 5.3.3. Firewall Filtering Preservation for the Migrating VM
Firewall ﬁltering is preserved for the migrated VM if and only if for any path in the destination







5.3.2 Mapping Firewall Filtering Preservation into CSP
In order to verify ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation in both data centers and for the migrating VM, we
encode all ﬁrewall rules in both data centers as explained in Section 5.2 and use the aforementioned
deﬁnitions in order to infer the corresponding equivalent constraint satisﬁability problem.
Let Cbsrc(Pi) (resp. Cbdst(Pj)) be the constraint that encodes the ﬁltering conditions of the ﬁre-
wall at the source (resp. destination) data center before migration on path Pi (resp. Pj). The
constraints Cbsrc(Pi) and Cbdst(Pj) represent the encoding in CSP of A
b
src and Abdst, respectively. Let
Casrc(Pi) (resp. Cadst(Pj)) be the constraint that encodes the ﬁltering conditions of the ﬁrewall at
the source (resp. destination) data center after migration. The constraints Casrc(Pi) and Cadst(Pj)
represent the encoding in CSP of Aasrc and Aadst, respectively. Let Cv be the constraint that speciﬁes
the packets that are destined to the migrating VM v. According to the set theory, two sets A and B
are equal, denoted A = B, if and only if A ⊆ B and B ⊆ A. We use this concept in order to prove
ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 5.3.1, Deﬁnition 5.3.2, and Deﬁnition 5.3.3
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using CSP framework. From Deﬁnition 5.3.1, Aasrc = Absrc ∖ Av if and only if Aasrc ⊆ Absrc ∖ Av








Equation (1) is equivalent to (Casrc(Pi)∧!Cbsrc(Pi)) ∨ (Casrc(Pi) ∧ Cv).
The conditionAv ≠ ∅ is veriﬁed if Cbsrc(Pi)∧!Casrc(Pi) is satisﬁable. Therefore, proving ﬁrewall
ﬁltering preservation in source data center is equivalent to prove for all paths that:
• C1 = Cbsrc(Pi)∧!Casrc(Pi) is satisﬁable
• C2 = Casrc(Pi)∧!Cbsrc(Pi) is unsatisﬁable
• C3 = Casrc(Pi) ∧ Cv is unsatisﬁable
• C4 = Cbsrc(Pi)∧!Cv∧!Casrc(Pi) is unsatisﬁable
From Deﬁnition 5.3.2, Abdst = A
a




dst ∖Av and A
a
dst ∖Av ⊆ A
b
dst.











dst(Pj) ∧ Cv. The unsatisﬁability of formula
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Cbdst(Pj) ∧ Cv states that before migration none of the rules concern v. This trivially holds thus, we
do not consider it in the veriﬁcation process. The condition Av ≠ ∅ is veriﬁed if Cadst(Pi)∧!C
b
dst(Pi)
is satisﬁable. Thus, proving ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation in the destination data center is equiva-
lent to prove for all paths that:
• C5 = Cadst(Pj)∧!C
b
dst(Pj) is satisﬁable.
• C6 = Cbdst(Pj)∧!C
a
dst(Pj) is unsatisﬁable.
• C7 = Cadst(Pj)∧!Cv∧!C
b
dst(Pj) is unsatisﬁable.



















dst. This condition holds if the following CSP problems are unsatisﬁable for



















Thus, proving ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation for the migrating VM is equivalent to prove for all
paths in destination data center that both C8 and C9 are unsatisﬁable. The satisﬁability of any one
of them implies that there is discrepancy between the migrated rules from source data center and
the rules migrated into the destination data center for path Pj . Figures 12, 13, 14 illustrate the
veriﬁcation approach, which consists of three steps: ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation in source data
center, ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation in destination data center, and then ﬁrewall ﬁltering preser-
vation of the migrated VM. Note that the horizontal bar in this ﬁgure means that all conditions
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have to hold before concluding on the ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation. For instance, in Figure 12, C1
has to be satisﬁable and C2, C3, and C4 have to be unsatisﬁable in order to conclude on the ﬁrewall






























Figure 13: Step 2 for a Path Pj in Destination Data Center
The evaluation of these constraints is interpreted relatively to a given path in source or destina-












Figure 14: Step 3 for a Path Pj in Destination Data Center
be used to identify the problematic rule(s). The interpretation of the undesired outputs as identiﬁed
in Figures 12, 13, 14 are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Interpretations of the Unexpected Constraints’ Satisfaction Values
e1 Absrc ⊆ Aasrc
e2 Absrc ⊂ Aasrc
e3 ∃p ∣ p ∈ Av and p ∈ Aasrc
e4 ∃p ∣ p ∈ Absrc and p ∉ Av and p ∉ Aasrc
e5 Aadst ⊆ A
b
dst
e6 Aadst ⊂ A
b
dst
e7 ∃p ∣ p ∈ Aadst and p ∉ Av and p ∉ A
b
dst
e8 Av,dst ⊂ Av,src, some rules from source data center did not migrate
e9 Av,src ⊂ Av,dst, more rules than migrated in destination data center
5.4 Stateless Distributed Firewall Case Study
To better illustrate our approach, we present a case study consisting of two data centers DC1 and
DC2 with distributed ﬁrewall settings as depicted in Figure 15, inspired from Amazon Elastic











































































Figure 16: Stateless Distributed Firewall Case Study - After Migration
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Table 2 summarizes the ﬁrewall rules in both data centers before migration. The need for
virtual machine mobility across data centers, has been expressed by many providers as it serves
several reasons including data center infrastructure maintenance, disaster avoidance, or data center
expansion to address power, cooling, and space constraints. Even though the technology is not
widespread at the moment, but we believe it is coming in the near future. In this case study, we
suppose that VM1 that belongs to the database group has to be migrated from the physical server
PS4 in data center DC2 to PS1 in data center DC1. Therefore, trafﬁc destined to application
group one in PS2 has to traverse FW1 and FW3, whereas trafﬁc destined to web group one and
the recently created database group one containing VM1, can either traverse FW1 followed by
FW2, or FW1 followed by FW3. Thus, all ﬁrewall conﬁgurations along the paths to the desti-
nation physical server PS1 in data center DC1 have to be updated as the result of this migration.
This means that after VM1 migration, the port 3306 in FW1 that was previously blocked, has to
be opened to allow the trafﬁc for database group one. In addition, all previously allowed trafﬁc to
database group should be accepted through both FW2 and FW3. Moreover, the required updates
have to be done for the ﬁrewalls in the source being FW4 and FW5. In this case, there is no
change in FW4, but the rules concerning VM1 have to be removed from FW5. As it is shown in
Figure 16, after migration there is one database group in each data center, one contains VM1, and
the other contains VM2.
In order to demonstrate the applicability of our veriﬁcation approach, we consider three sce-
narios:
Scenario 1 - Migration Error 1. The administrator correctly updated FW1, FW2, and FW5, but
omitted to add the rules to FW3. In such a scenario, FW3 rules after migration will be the same
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Table 2: Firewall Rules in Data Centers DC1 and DC2 - Before Migration
FW1
1. TCP *.*.*.* ANY *.*.*.* 80 Allow
2. TCP *.*.*.* ANY *.*.*.* 443 Allow
3. TCP *.*.*.* ANY *.*.*.* 22 Allow
4. TCP *.*.*.* ANY *.*.*.* 8000 Allow
FW2
1. TCP *.*.*.* ANY VM5,VM6,VM7 80 Allow
2. TCP *.*.*.* ANY VM5,VM6,VM7 443 Allow
3. TCP CorpIP ANY VM5,VM6,VM7 22 Allow
FW3
1. TCP *.*.*.* ANY VM5,VM6,VM7 80 Allow
2. TCP *.*.*.* ANY VM5,VM6,VM7 443 Allow
3. TCP CorpIP ANY VM5,VM6,VM7 22 Allow
4. TCP VM3,VM4,VM5,VM6,VM7 ANY AP1 8000 Allow
5. TCP CorpIP ANY AP1 22 Allow
FW4
1. TCP *.*.*.* ANY *.*.*.* 80 Allow
2. TCP *.*.*.* ANY *.*.*.* 443 Allow
3. TCP *.*.*.* ANY *.*.*.* 22 Allow
4. TCP *.*.*.* ANY *.*.*.* 3306 Allow
5. TCP *.*.*.* ANY *.*.*.* 8000 Allow
FW5
1. TCP *.*.*.* ANY VM3,VM4 80 Allow
2. TCP *.*.*.* ANY VM3,VM4 443 Allow
3. TCP CorpIP ANY VM1,VM2 22 Allow
4. TCP CorpIP ANY VM3,VM4 22 Allow
5. TCP CorpIP ANY AP2 22 Allow
6. TCP AP1 ANY VM1,VM2 3306 Allow
7. TCP AP2 ANY VM1,VM2 3306 Allow
8. TCP VM3,VM4,VM5,VM6,VM7 ANY AP2 8000 Allow
as before.
Scenario 2 - Migration Error 2. The administrator correctly updated the rules in FW1, FW2, and
FW5, but missed some rules in FW3.
Scenario 3 - Migration Error 3. The administrator correctly migrated the ﬁrewall rules to FW1,
FW2, and FW3, but forgot to update FW5.
Scenario 4 - Correct Migration. The ﬁrewall rules are correctly migrated on every path of the
network and are provided in Table 3. Note that FW4 do not need to be modiﬁed after migration.
In order to verify ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation, we translate the distributed ﬁrewall conﬁgura-
tion for each scenario into CSP, and use Sugar SAT-solver to verify the satisﬁability of the CSP
constraints. The veriﬁcation results for the four scenarios are summarized in Table 4. Therein, we
68
Table 3: Updated Firewall Rules in Data Centers DC1 and DC2 - After Migration
FW1
1. TCP *.*.*.* ANY *.*.*.* 80 Allow
2. TCP *.*.*.* ANY *.*.*.* 443 Allow
3. TCP *.*.*.* ANY *.*.*.* 22 Allow
4. TCP *.*.*.* ANY *.*.*.* 8000 Allow
5. TCP *.*.*.* ANY *.*.*.* 3306 Allow
FW2
1. TCP *.*.*.* ANY VM5,VM6,VM7 80 Allow
2. TCP *.*.*.* ANY VM5,VM6,VM7 443 Allow
3. TCP CorpIP ANY VM5,VM6,VM7 22 Allow
4. TCP CorpIP ANY VM1 22 Allow
5. TCP AP1 ANY VM1 3306 Allow
6. TCP AP2 ANY VM1 3306 Allow
FW3
1. TCP *.*.*.* ANY VM5, VM6,VM7 80 Allow
2. TCP *.*.*.* ANY VM5, VM6,VM7 443 Allow
3. TCP CorpIP ANY VM5, VM6,VM7 22 Allow
4. TCP VM3,VM4,VM5,VM6,VM7 ANY AP1 8000 Allow
5. TCP CorpIP ANY AP1 22 Allow
6. TCP CorpIP ANY VM1 22 Allow
7. TCP AP1 ANY VM1 3306 Allow
8. TCP AP2 ANY VM1 3306 Allow
FW5
1. TCP *.*.*.* ANY VM3,VM4 80 Allow
2. TCP *.*.*.* ANY VM3,VM4 443 Allow
3. TCP CorpIP ANY VM2 22 Allow
4. TCP CorpIP ANY VM3,VM4 22 Allow
5. TCP CorpIP ANY AP2 22 Allow
6. TCP AP1 ANY VM2 3306 Allow
7. TCP AP2 ANY VM2 3306 Allow
8. TCP VM3,VM4,VM5,VM6,VM7 ANY AP2 8000 Allow
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show only the results for the path that has a ﬁrewall conﬁguration error which are FW1 ⊙ FW3
for scenario one and scenarion two, and FW4 ⊙ FW5 for scenario four. Bold values in Table 4
show the constraints, which satisfactions are not as expected. When the solver returns satisﬁable
for a constraint expected to be unsatisﬁable, a solution is provided that pinpoints one of the rules
that makes security requirements fails. This indicates a possible error that should be investigated in
order to correct the ﬁrewall conﬁguration. In order to have an assessment of the performance over-
Table 4: Sugar CSP Solver Results for the Three Scenarios
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9
Scen- 1 SAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT SAT UNSAT
Scen- 2 SAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT SAT UNSAT UNSAT SAT UNSAT
Scen- 3 UNSAT UNSAT SAT UNSAT SAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT SAT
Scen- 4 SAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT SAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT
head, we performed a set of experiments on an Intel Core i7 2.67 GHz processor with 12Gbytes of
RAM. The veriﬁcation performance depends on the total number of ﬁrewall rules. Table 5 sum-
marizes the result in terms of CPU time for an increased number of rules, which is mostly due to
increasing the number of VMs. The result shows that the CPU time consumption increases ap-
proximately linearly, also conﬁrmed by [31].
Table 5: Performance Evaluation for Stateless FW








IDS Monitoring and IPsec Protection
Preservation
In a dynamic cloud computing environment, a VM may leave a physical machine called source
host, to be relocated in another host, called destination host. During migration, the security rules
that are associated with the migrating VM should follow the VM. Therefore, they should be re-
moved from the source location, and applied at the destination location. Thus, it is very important
to ensure each time that security of the migrating VM as well as of the other co-located VMs has
not been compromised by the migration process. In this chapter, we consider two other security
mechanisms, namely intrusion detection and prevention, and IPsec, which play an important role
in the security of the cloud’s infrastructure, and its resources, and VMs. We suppose that all IDSs
and IPsec devices are correctly conﬁgured before migration, and that the initial conﬁgurations in
both hosts are compliant with the pre-deﬁned security policies. In this thesis, we consider an IDS
architecture where a virtual appliance dedicated for intrusion monitoring, called security monitor
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(SM), is attached to the hypervisors of the hosts. In addition, we assume having hardware IDS
appliances connected to the hosts through network interfaces. It is the responsibility of the hy-
pervisor to determine the decision of which part of the trafﬁc should be monitored by the virtual
appliance, and which one by its hardware counterpart. We also consider IPsec endpoints located at
the edges of the data centers and the customer network.
6.1 Encoding IDS and IPsec Conﬁguration in CSP
As far as the input format of IDS conﬁguration ﬁles is concerned, we consider Snort [96] intrusion
detection system, which is an open source IDS that is widely used in many networks. A Snort rule
consists of two sections, a rule header and some rule options. The rule header contains criteria for
matching a rule against data packets, and the action to be taken. The options part usually contains
an alert message as well as information about the parts of the packet that should be used to generate
the alert message. The options part may also contain additional criteria for matching a rule against
data inside the packets. There are three major action directives that Snort supports when a packet
matches a speciﬁed rule pattern: pass, log, or alert. Pass rules simply drop the packet. Log rules
write the full packet to the logging routine. Alert rules generate an event notiﬁcation using the
user-speciﬁed method, and then log the full packet using the selected logging mechanism for later
analysis. In the following, we present how we encode IDS conﬁgurations in Sugar.
The CSP variables are the set of integer variables V needed to encode the monitoring attributes
of IDS rules. In order to represent an IP address, 4 integer variables within the range [0,255] are
used. A source (resp. destination) IP address is represented by {sipi}1≤i≤4 (resp. {dipi}1≤i≤4). The
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integer variable pr ∈ [0,255] represents the protocol number. We also deﬁne two other integer
variables to encode the source and destination port numbers, respectively ps and pd within the
range of values [0,65535]. We encode the direction (ingress, egress or bidirectional) using an
integer variable dr ∈ [0,1] so that 1 represents bidirectional trafﬁc and 0 represents unidirectional
trafﬁc such that we switch the IP addresses and the ports from source to destination and vice
versa to represent ingress or egress trafﬁc. The action is encoded using a variable act ∈ [0,2]
so that 0 represents pass, 1 represents log, and 2 represents alert. To encode the rule options we
use a variable opt ∈ [0,40000] so that each value represents a unique option value. Note that
here we assume an IDS which is enabled to recognize the signatures of maximum 40000 attacks.
This number is only the maximum number that we are sure not to bypass in our case study. Our
experiments show that we can cover up to 5000 attack signatures for the moment. Since it is
possible to have more than one option, we encode them as a logical conjunction formula of all
options. The action in the rule header is invoked only when all criteria in the options are true.
In the case of IDS rules the set of integer variables in CSP is V = {act, pr, sip1, sip2, sip3, sip4,
ps, dr, dip1, dip2, dip3, dip4, pd, opt}. Each single IDS rule predicate p is encoded as a CSP con-
straint. The latter is a conjunctive logical formula over the variables in V with their corresponding
values speciﬁed in the IDS rule. More precisely, a CSP constraint is written as act = v1 ∧ pr =
v2 ∧ sip1 = v3 ⋯ ∧ dip4 = v12 ∧ pd = v13 ∧ opt = v14 where vi is to be replaced by the
actual value in the corresponding IDS rule. The IDS is then encoded as a constraint C built as
a disjunctive logical formula over all constraints of the IDS rules. Thus, the list of IDS rules
(pn → dn).(pn−1 → dn−1). ⋯ .nop are encoded as the logical formula p1 ∨ p2 ∨ ⋯ ∨ pn. In Sugar
syntax, this is denoted by (or p1 . . . pn).
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In order to encode IPsec conﬁguration in Sugar, we use a subset of the aforementioned CSP
variables in order to encode the ﬁltering attributes of IPsec rules. The representation of source (and
destination) IP address, source (and destination) port, and protocol number are exactly the same
as the presentation in IDS. For the IPsec protocols ESP and AH, we deﬁne a variable called ipsec
having the values 50 and 51, respectively. To encode the mode (transport or tunnel), we deﬁne
a variable md, which values are in {0,1} such that 0 encodes transport mode and 1 encodes the
tunnel mode. In terms of action ﬁeld in IPsec, we use a variable act, which has values in {0,1,2}
such that 0 encodes discard, 1 encodes bypass, and 2 encodes protect. For the case of tunnel mode,
the destination gateway is encoded by a variable gw and its values are in {1,m} such that m is
the maximum number of gateways in the network. Also a variable param is deﬁned to encode the
authentication or cryptographic algorithms being used such as 3DES, MD5 and so on. Its values
are in {1, n} such that n is the number of authentication and cryptographic parameters available
in the conﬁguration. In the case of an empty gateway conﬁguration, the corresponding constraint
will be the truth value FALSE.
6.2 Approach
In this section, we present our approach to verify intrusion monitoring preservation and IPsec
protection preservation properties in dynamic cloud computing environment. First, we deﬁne the
meaning of intrusion monitoring preservation property and then derive the needed formulas to
verify this property in source and destination hosts as well as for the migrating VM. Second, we
present the concept of IPsec protection preservation, and then derive the corresponding formulas
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to verify this property in source and destination data center, in customer network, and for the
migrating virtual machine. Afterward, we elaborate on the CSP constraints, which satisﬁabilities
allow verifying the deﬁned security preservation properties. Finally, we describe the proposed
veriﬁcation procedure, and explain the outcome of the Sugar solver. In dynamic cloud computing
environment, a VM may leave a physical machine called source host, to be relocated in another
host, called destination host. During migration, the security rules should follow the VM and thus,
should be removed from the source location and applied at the destination location. Thus, it is
very important to ensure each time that the security of the migrating VM as well as of the other
co-located VMs have not been compromised by the migration process. We suppose that all IDSs
and IPsec devices are correctly conﬁgured before migration, and that the initial conﬁgurations in
both hosts are compliant with the pre-deﬁned security policies.
6.2.1 Intrusion Monitoring Preservation
In the following, we deﬁne the meaning of intrusion monitoring preservation in dynamic cloud
computing environment. Let M bs and Mas be the monitoring rules in the source host before and
after migration, respectively. Let Mv be the monitoring rules with respect to the migrating VM v.
Intuitively, monitoring is preserved in the source host if the only difference between monitoring
policy before and after migration is the rules with regards to the migrating VM v. Note here that
we require Mv ≠ ∅ otherwise, this will be a trivial case where no rule is attached to the migrated
VM.
Deﬁnition 6.2.1. Intrusion Monitoring Preservation in Source Host
Intrusion monitoring is preserved in source host if and only if, we have Mas = M bs ∖Mv and
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Mv ≠ ∅.
Similarly for the destination host, we would like to verify intrusion monitoring preservation
property.
Deﬁnition 6.2.2. Intrusion Monitoring Preservation in Destination Host
Intrusion monitoring is preserved in destination host if and only if, we have M bd = M
a
d ∖Mv and
Mv ≠ ∅ and M bs ⊆Mad .
Note that Deﬁnition 6.2.2 contains an extra condition (M bs ⊆ Mad ) if compared to Deﬁnition
6.2.1. This condition is important as it is used to compare IDS capabilities of the two hosts in
order to ensure that the IDS signatures in destination are at least equal or more up-to-date than
those of the source host.
For the migrating VM, we need to ensure that the migrated VM is monitored at least at the same
level (or more) in the destination host after migration. Thus, intrusion monitoring is preserved for
the migrating VM if the monitoring policy for that VM in the destination host after migration is a
superset of those at the source host before migration. This is stated in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 6.2.3. Intrusion Monitoring Preservation for the Migrating VM
Intrusion monitoring is preserved for the migrated VM if and only if we have M bs ∖Mas ⊆ Mad ∖
M bd .
6.2.2 Mapping Intrusion Monitoring Preservation into CSP
In order to verify monitoring preservation in both hosts and for the migrating VM, we encode all
IDSs rules in both hosts as explained in Section 6.1, and use the aforementioned deﬁnitions in
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order to infer the corresponding equivalent constraint satisfaction problems.
Let Cbs (resp. Cbd) be the constraint that encodes the monitoring conditions of the IDS at the
source (resp. destination) host before migration by monitoring appliance (either physical or virtual
appliances). The constraints Cbs and Cbd represent the encoding in CSP of M
b
s and M bd , respectively.
Let Cas (resp. Cad ) be the constraint that encodes the monitoring conditions of the IDS at the source
(resp. destination) host after migration. The constraints Cas and Cad represent the encoding in CSP
ofMas and Mad , respectively. Let Cv be the constraint that speciﬁes the monitoring policy regarding
to the migrating VM v. According to the set theory, two sets A and B are equal, denoted A = B,
if and only if A ⊆ B and B ⊆ A. We use this concept in order to prove monitoring preservation
as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 6.2.1, Deﬁnition 6.2.2, and Deﬁnition 6.2.3 using CSP framework. From
Deﬁnition 6.2.1,Mas =M bs∖Mv if and only ifMas ⊆M bs∖Mv andM bs∖Mv ⊆Mas . These conditions







Equation (7) is equivalent to (Cas∧!Cbs) ∨ (Cas ∧ Cv). The condition Mv ≠ ∅ is veriﬁed if Cbs∧!Cas is
satisﬁable. Therefore, proving monitoring preservation in source host is equivalent to prove that:
• C1 = Cbs∧!Cas is satisﬁable
• C2 = Cas∧!Cbs is unsatisﬁable
• C3 = Cas ∧ Cv is unsatisﬁable
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• C4 = Cbs∧!Cv∧!Cas is unsatisﬁable
From Deﬁnition 6.2.2, M bd =M
a




















d∧Cv). The unsatisﬁability of formula C
b
d∧Cv states that
before migration none of the rules concern v. This trivially holds therefore, we do not consider it
in the veriﬁcation process. The condition Mv ≠ ∅ is veriﬁed if Cad∧!C
b
d is satisﬁable. From the same




Thus, proving intrusion monitoring preservation in the destination host is equivalent to prove that:
• C5 = Cad∧!C
b
d is satisﬁable.
• C6 = Cbd∧!C
a
d is unsatisﬁable.
• C7 = Cad∧!Cv∧!C
b
d is unsatisﬁable.
• C8 = Cbs∧!Cad is unsatisﬁable.
From Deﬁnition 6.2.3, M bs ∖Mas ⊆Mad ∖M
b
d hold if we have:
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• C9 = Cbs∧!Cas∧!(Cad∧!C
b
d) is unsatisﬁable.
Thus, the unsatisﬁability of C9 implies that the monitored trafﬁc in source host targeting the
migrating VM is at least equal or included in the trafﬁc monitored in destination host. More
precisely, this provides a proof that the IDS signatures at the destination are always equal or more
updated than those in the source.
Figures 17-19 illustrate our veriﬁcation steps for IDS. Note that the horizontal bar in the ﬁgures
means that all conditions have to hold before concluding on the monitoring preservation. For
instance, in Figure 17, C1 has to be satisﬁable and C2, C3, and C4 have to be unsatisﬁable in order

















Figure 17: Intrusion Monitoring Veriﬁcation in Source Host
In the case of a constraint is satisﬁable, the CSP solver provides a solution that can be used
to identify the problematic rule(s). The interpretation of the undesired satisﬁability outputs as
























Figure 19: Intrusion Monitoring Veriﬁcation for the Migrating VM
Table 6: Interpretations of the Unexpected Constraints’ Satisfaction Values for IDS
Error Interpretation
e1 M bs ⊆Mas
e2 M bs ⊂Mas
e3 Mv ∩Mas ≠ ∅












s , signatures at destination IDS less than the source
e9 Mdv ⊂M sv , some rules from source host are not at destination
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6.2.3 IPsec Protection Preservation
IPsec functions will be correctly executed only if the related policies are correctly speciﬁed and
conﬁgured at both sites establishing the tunnel. IPsec conﬁguration spans multiple devices includ-
ing the VM and the servers on the corporate network for authentication, and on the gateways in
the source and destination data centers as well as at the customer side. Let Ebl and E
a
l be the IPsec
protected trafﬁc in the location l, l ∈ {s, d, cust} before and after migration, respectively, where s
is for source, d is for destination, and cust is for customer network. Let Etv be the IPsec trafﬁc con-
cerning the virtual machine v at t ∈ {a, b}. Let EGWd,v be the IPsec trafﬁc between the destination
data center and the migrating VM v.
Non-Migrating Virtual Machines. With respect to IPsec protection in the data centers, we
should verify that the IPsec conﬁgurations of all non-migrating VMs in the source as well as in the
destination data centers have not been modiﬁed after the migration of v.
Deﬁnition 6.2.4. IPsec Protection Preservation in the Data Centers and Customer Network
In source data center, in destination data center, and in the customer network, IPsec protection is
preserved if we have respectively:
• Eas = Ebs ∖Ebv





• Ebcust ∖Ebv = Eacust ∖Eav
Migrating Virtual Machine. With respect to the IPsec trafﬁc of the migrating VM v, we
should verify that it is protected equally before and after migration. This implies that the veriﬁ-
cation should be performed taking into account both the cloud providers and customer gateways.
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Intuitively, we need ﬁrst to verify that the IPsec rules that were added to the destination data cen-
ter gateway after migration are exactly the same as the ones deleted from the source data center
gateway. This holds since no modiﬁcation is required for the rules’ attributes that are on the side
of the cloud provider. Secondly, we need to verify at the customer side that the IPsec rules for v
have been correctly updated such that the cryptographic parameters have not been changed, and the
gateway’s IP at the destination data center has correctly replaced the gateway’s IP at the source data
center after migration. The following deﬁnition states formally the meaning of IPsec protection
preservation for the migrating VM.
Deﬁnition 6.2.5. IPsec Protection Preservation for the Migrating VM For the migrating VM,








• Independently of the gateways, we have Eacust ∖Ebcust = ∅
• Considering the gateways, we have Eacust ∖Ebcust ⊆ EGWd,v
6.2.4 Mapping IPsec Protection Preservation into CSP
In this section, we describe the constraints that we built in order to answer the veriﬁcation problem.
Let CtE,l be the constraint that encodes the IPsec-enabled appliances conﬁgurations where t ∈ {a, b}
and l ∈ {s, d, cust}. Let Cv be the constraint encoding the condition that considered trafﬁc corre-
sponds to the virtual machine v. Let C′tE,cust be the constraint that encodes the trafﬁc protected
independently of the gateways IP involved in the IPsec tunnel at the customer side. Let CGWd,v be
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the constraint for encoding the trafﬁc between the destination data center gateway GWd and v. As
we are interested in disregarding all encrypted trafﬁc concerning v, we can encode both Ebv and Eav
as Cv.
According to Deﬁnition 6.2.4 and set theory for the source data center, IPsec protection is
preserved if we have Eas ⊆ Ebs ∖ Ebv and Ebs ∖ Ebv ⊆ Eas . This is equivalent to verify that the
following constraints are unsatisﬁable:
CbE,s ∧ ¬C
a
E,s ∧ ¬Cv (12)
CaE,s ∧ ¬(C
b





E,s ∧ Cv] (13)
In addition to these conditions, we also add another constraint in order to ensure that there is
actually IPsec rules for the migrating VM such that CbE,s ∧ ¬C
a
E,s is satisﬁable. In summary, the
constraints that should be veriﬁed to ensure IPsec protection preservation in source data center are
as follows:
• C10 = CbE,s ∧ ¬C
a
E,s is satisﬁable
• C11 = CaE,s ∧ ¬C
b
E,s is unsatisﬁable
• C12 = CaE,s ∧ Cv is unsatisﬁable
• C13 = CbE,s ∧ ¬C
a
E,s ∧ ¬Cv is unsatisﬁable










d. This is equivalent to verify that the following constraints are unsatisﬁable:
CbE,d ∧ ¬(C
a





E,d ∧ Cv] (14)
CaE,d ∧ ¬C
b
E,d ∧ ¬Cv (15)
From Equation 14 the unsatisﬁability of formula CbE,d ∧Cv states that in destination data center
before migration, none of the rules concern v. This trivially holds so we do not consider it in the
veriﬁcation process. In addition to these conditions, we also add another constraint in order to
ensure that there is actually IPsec rules for the migrating VM at the destination data center such
that CaE,d ∧ ¬C
b
E,d is satisﬁable. In summary, the constraints that should be veriﬁed to ensure IPsec
protection preservation in destination data center are as follows:
• C14 = CaE,d ∧ ¬C
b
E,d is satisﬁable
• C15 = CbE,d ∧ ¬C
a
E,d is unsatisﬁable
• C16 = CaE,d ∧ ¬C
b
E,d ∧ ¬Cv is unsatisﬁable







v. This is equivalent to verify that the following constraints are unsatisﬁable:
CbE,cust ∧ ¬Cv ∧ ¬(C
a
E,cust ∧ ¬Cv) (16)
CaE,cust ∧ ¬Cv ∧ ¬(C
b
E,cust ∧ ¬Cv) (17)
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After expanding the above constraints using the same approach, we obtain the following:
• C17 = CbE,cust ∧ ¬Cv ∧ ¬C
a
E,cust is unsatisﬁable
• C18 = CaE,cust ∧ ¬Cv ∧ ¬C
b
E,cust is unsatisﬁable
We have to verify the satisﬁability of the following constraints to make sure that there are
changes before and after migration, which means that the unsatisﬁability of the above constraints
is not a trivial case:
• C19 = CbE,cust ∧ ¬C
a
E,cust is satisﬁable
• C20 = CaE,cust ∧ ¬C
b
E,cust is satisﬁable
For the migrating VM (Deﬁnition 6.2.5), three conditions have to be veriﬁed. The ﬁrst one,













and Ebs ∖Eas ⊆ Ead ∖E
b
d. This is equivalent to verify that:














The second condition, from equality Eacust ∖ Ebcust = ∅ and set theory, is equivalent to verify
that:





Finally, from Eacust ∖Ebcust ⊆ EGWd,v and set theory, we have:
CaE,cust ∧ ¬C
b
E,cust ∧ ¬CGWd,v (18)
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Unsatisﬁability of above constraint is equivalent to:
• C24 = CaE,cust ∧ ¬C
b
E,cust is satisﬁable
• C25 = CaE,cust ∧ ¬C
b
E,cust ∧ ¬CGWd,v is unsatisﬁable
Figures 20-22 illustrates the veriﬁcation steps for IPsec. In the case of a constraint satisﬁability,













































Figure 21: IPsec Protection Veriﬁcation in Customer Network
The interpretation of the unexpected outputs as identiﬁed in Figures 20-22 are summarized in






















Figure 22: IPsec Protection Veriﬁcation for the Migrating VM
Table 7: Interpretations of the Unexpected Constraints’ Satisfaction Values for IPsec
Error Interpretation
e10 Ebs ⊆ Eas
e11 Ebs ⊂ Eas
e12 ∃p ∣ p ∈ Ev and p ∈ Eas
e13 ∃p ∣ p ∈ Ebs and p ∉ Ev and p ∉ Eas
e14 Ead ⊆ E
b
d
e15 Ead ⊂ E
b
d
e16 ∃p ∣ p ∈ Ead and p ∉ Ev and p ∉ E
b
d
e17 ∃p ∣ p ∈ Ebcust and p ∉ Ev and p ∉ Eacust
e18 ∃p ∣ p ∈ Eacust and p ∉ Ev and p ∉ Ebcust
e19 Ebcust ⊆ Eacust
e20 Eacust ⊆ Ebcust
e21 Ev,s ⊂ Ev,d, more rules than migrated in destination DC
e22 Ev,d ⊂ Ev,s, some rules from source DC did not migrate
e23 Ebcust ⊂ Eacust, independent of the gateway
e24 similar to e20




6.3 IDS and IPsec Case Study
In this section, we apply our approach on a case study to demonstrate the usefulness and appli-
cability of our approach. The case study consists of a cloud computing model with two physical
hosts H1 and H2 located in two different data centers, where IPsec gateways and IDS appliances
are deployed as depicted in Figure 23. Furthermore, we assume several virtual machines deployed
in these data centers.
Table 8 provides a subset of the IDS rules before migration. The IPSec policy before and
after migration are given in Table 10 and 11, respectively. We suppose that for the sake of load
balancing, VM4 has to be migrated from the H1 to H2. The trafﬁc destined to VM4 after migration
will be monitored by the physical intrusion detection IDS2 and the virtual security monitor SM2
whereas, it was monitored by IDS1 and SM1 before migration. Thus, all IDSs conﬁgurations have
to be updated after migration.
We propose to provide migration scenarios where the IPsec and IDS conﬁgurations after migra-
tion are not correctly updated in various enforcement endpoints. With respect to IDS, we consider
the following scenarios:
Scenario 1 - Error 1. The administrator correctly updated SM2 but left SM1 same as before mi-
gration.
Scenario 2 - Error 2. The administrator correctly updated SM1 but missed some rules in the con-
ﬁguration of SM2.
Scenario 3 - Correct Migration. The rules are correctly migrated for every intrusion detection of
the network and are provided in Table 9.
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Figure 23: IDS and IPsec Case Study
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Table 8: Sample IDS Rules in H1 and H2 - Before Migration
IDS1
1. alert TCP Ext ANY -> H1 [135:139,
445,1025]
(msg:"E2[rb] SHELLCODE x86 0x90
unicode NOOP"; content:"|90 90 90 90 90
90 90 90 90 90|"; ... ; rev:1;)
2. alert TCP Ext ANY -> H1 445 (msg: "E2[rb] NETBIOS SMB-
DS IPC$ unicode share access";
ﬂow:established,to_server; ... ; sid:22466;
rev:7;)
3. alert TCP Ext !20 -> H1 ANY (msg:"E3[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE Mal-
ware Windows executable sent from re-
mote host"; content: "MZ"; ... ; rev:3;)
4. alert UDP H1 ANY -> Ext 69 (msg:"E3[rb] TFTP GET from external
source"; ... ; rev:1;)
SM1






(msg:"E2[rb] SHELLCODE x86 0x90
unicode NOOP"; content:"|90 90 90 90 90
90 90 90 90 90|"; ... ; rev:1;)




ANY (msg:"E3[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE Mal-
ware Windows executable sent from re-
mote host"; content: "MZ"; ... ; rev:3;)
IDS2
1. alert TCP Ext ANY -> H2 [135:139,
445,1025]
(msg:"E2[rb] SHELLCODE x86 0x90
unicode NOOP"; content:"|90 90 90 90 90
90 90 90 90 90|"; ... ; rev:1;)
2. alert TCP Ext ANY -> H2 445 (msg: "E2[rb] NETBIOS SMB-
DS IPC$ unicode share access";
ﬂow:established,to_server; ... ; sid:22466;
rev:7;)
3. alert TCP Ext !20 -> H2 ANY (msg:"E3[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE Mal-
ware Windows executable sent from re-
mote host"; content: "MZ"; ... ; rev:3;)
SM2





(msg:"E2[rb] SHELLCODE x86 0x90
unicode NOOP"; content:"|90 90 90 90 90
90 90 90 90 90|"; ... ; rev:1;)
2. alert TCP H2 !20 -> VM5,
VM6,
VM7
ANY (msg:"E3[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE Mal-
ware Windows executable sent from re-
mote host"; content: "MZ"; ... ; rev:3;)
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Table 9: Updated IDS Rules in H1 and H2- After Migration
IDS1
1. alert TCP Ext ANY -> H1-VM4 [135:139,
445,1025]
(msg:"E2[rb] SHELLCODE x86 0x90
unicode NOOP"; content:"|90 90 90 90 90
90 90 90 90 90|"; ... ; rev:1;)
2. alert TCP Ext ANY -> H1-VM4 445 (msg: "E2[rb] NETBIOS SMB-
DS IPC$ unicode share access";
ﬂow:established,to_server; ... ; sid:22466;
rev:7;)
3. alert TCP Ext !20 -> H1-VM4 ANY (msg:"E3[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE Mal-
ware Windows executable sent from re-
mote host"; content: "MZ"; ... ; rev:3;)
4. alert UDP H1-VM4 ANY -> Ext 69 (msg:"E3[rb] TFTP GET from external
source"; ... ; rev:1;)
SM1





(msg:"E2[rb] SHELLCODE x86 0x90
unicode NOOP"; content:"|90 90 90 90 90
90 90 90 90 90|"; ... ; rev:1;)
2. alert TCP H1-VM4 !20 -> VM1,
VM2,
VM3
ANY (msg:"E3[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE Mal-
ware Windows executable sent from re-
mote host"; content: "MZ"; ... ; rev:3;)
IDS2
1. alert TCP Ext ANY -> H2+VM4 [135:139,
445,1025]
(msg:"E2[rb] SHELLCODE x86 0x90
unicode NOOP"; content:"|90 90 90 90 90
90 90 90 90 90|"; ... ; rev:1;)
2. alert TCP Ext ANY -> H2+VM4 445 (msg: "E2[rb] NETBIOS SMB-
DS IPC$ unicode share access";
ﬂow:established,to_server; ... ; sid:22466;
rev:7;)
3. alert TCP Ext !20 -> H2+VM4 ANY (msg:"E3[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE Mal-
ware Windows executable sent from re-
mote host"; content: "MZ"; ... ; rev:3;)
SM2






(msg:"E2[rb] SHELLCODE x86 0x90
unicode NOOP"; content:"|90 90 90 90 90
90 90 90 90 90|"; ... ; rev:1;)




ANY (msg:"E3[rb] BLEEDING-EDGE Mal-
ware Windows executable sent from re-
mote host"; content: "MZ"; ... ; rev:3;)
Table 10: IPSec Policy Before Migration
GW1
1. TCP VM1, VM2, ANY CorpNet ANY ESP Tunnel
VM3, VM4 GW3 {3DES}
GW3
1. TCP CorpNet ANY VM1, VM2, ANY ESP Tunnel
VM3, VM4 GW1 {3DES}
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Table 11: IPSec Policy After Migration
GW1
1. TCP VM1, VM2, ANY CorpNet ANY ESP Tunnel
VM3 GW3 {3DES}
GW2
1. TCP VM4 ANY CorpNet ANY ESP Tunnel
GW3 {3DES}
GW3
1. TCP CorpNet ANY VM1, VM2, ANY ESP Tunnel
VM3 GW1 {3DES}
2. TCP CorpNet ANY VM4 ANY ESP Tunnel
GW2 {3DES}
The veriﬁcation results for the IDS scenarios are summarized in Table 12. Values in bold
show the constraints, which satisfactions are not as expected. When the solver returns satisﬁable
for a constraint expected to be unsatisﬁable, a solution is provided that pinpoints one of the rules
that makes security requirements fails. This indicates a possible error that should be investigated
in order to correct the conﬁguration error. For IDS scenario 1, C1 and C3 have the unexpected
satisﬁability results of UNSAT and SAT, respectively. The satisﬁability of the former can be
explained by the fact that every rule in the conﬁguration before is necessarily in the conﬁguration
after. The satisﬁability of the latter is due to the fact that some rules concerning the migrating VM
v have not been removed from the source, which corroborate the former result. The fact that C3
is SAT, the SAT-solver returned a solution for this constraint, which consists of a vector of values
(a value per CSP variable) that represents one of the rules that have not been removed from the
source.
With respect to IPsec, we consider the following scenarios:
Scenario 1 - Error 1. The administrator correctly updated GW1, but omitted any change to GW2.
Scenario 2 - Error 2. The administrator correctly updated the IPSec conﬁguration in GW1 and
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Table 12: Veriﬁcation Results for the IDS Three Scenarios
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 C7 C8 C9
Scen- 1 UNSAT UNSAT SAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT
Scen- 2 SAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT SAT UNSAT SAT SAT SAT
Scen- 3 SAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT SAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT
GW2, but the customer gateway GW3 has not been updated.
Scenario 3 - Correct Migration. The IPSec conﬁgurations on all the gateways are correctly con-
ﬁgured, and the rules are provided in Table 11.
The veriﬁcation results for the IPSec scenarios are summarized in Table 13 and Table 14.
Values in bold show the constraints, which satisfactions are not as expected. For IPsec scenario
1, C14 and C22 have the unexpected satisﬁability results of UNSAT and SAT, respectively. The
satisﬁability of the former can be explained by the fact that at the destination, every rule in the
conﬁguration after migration is necessarily in the conﬁguration before. The satisﬁability of the
latter is due to the fact that some rules concerning the migrating VM v have not been migrated to
the destination, which corroborate the former result. The fact that C22 is SAT, the solver returned
a solution for this constraint, which consists of a vector of values (a value per CSP variable) that
represents one of the rules that have not been migrated from the source.
Table 13: Veriﬁcation Results for the IPSec Scenarios: the Source DC, Destination DC
C10 C11 C12 C13 C14 C15 C16
Scen-1 SAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT
Scen-2 SAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT SAT UNSAT UNSAT
Scen-3 SAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT SAT UNSAT UNSAT
In order to have an assessment of the performance overhead, we performed a set of experiments
on an Intel Core i7 2.67 GHz processor with 12Gbytes of RAM. The veriﬁcation performance for
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Table 14: Veriﬁcation Results for the IPSec Scenarios for the Customer Network and the Migrating
VM
C17 C18 C19 C20 C21 C22 C23 C24 C25
Scen- 1 UNSAT UNSAT SAT SAT UNSAT SAT UNSAT SAT UNSAT
Scen- 2 UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT
Scen- 3 UNSAT UNSAT SAT SAT UNSAT UNSAT UNSAT SAT UNSAT
the IDS depends on the total number of attack signatures and also total number of virtual machines.
Whereas, the veriﬁcation performance for the IPsec depends on total number of virtual machines
which relatively determines the total number of rules to be conﬁgured in the IPsec gatweays. Ta-
bles 15 and 16 summarize the results in terms of CPU time for the IDS and IPsec, respectively.
Table 15: Performance Evaluation for IDS
Number of VMs Number of Attack Signatures Number of Rules CPU Time (sec)
3 10 30 0.186
3 50 150 0.232
3 100 300 0.325
3 500 1500 0.389
3 1000 3000 0.482
3 2000 6000 0.637
3 5000 15000 2.167
Table 16: Performance Evaluation for IPsec













In this chapter, we summarize the contributions of this thesis, and provide directions for future
work.
7.1 Summary of Contributions
In this thesis, we addressed the issue of security policy preservation in elastic cloud computing
environment with ﬁrewalls, intrusion detection and IPsec VPN as the principal security mecha-
nisms. We proposed a novel veriﬁcation and validation approach based on the notion of security
policy preservation and the constraint satisfaction problems framework. First, the formal deﬁnition
of ﬁrewall ﬁltering preservation in source and destination data center as well as for the migrating
VM was provided. Then, we elaborated a framework that describes these security preservation
problems in terms of constraint satisfaction problems. Later on, we demonstrated the feasibility
of our approach by verifying several cases using Sugar, a SAT-based constraint solver. In order
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to automate the encoding, we proposed to model cloud network topology using cloud calculus,
and to use an intermediate syntax in order to express serial and parallel composition of ﬁrewalls.
The proposed automated approach is helpful for practitioners to tackle the uprising issues of net-
work security in a highly dynamic cloud computing environment. In addition, we presented our
approach for veriﬁcation of intrusion monitoring preservation as well as IPsec protection preser-
vation by solving a set of constraint satisfaction problems. Finally, we presented case studies for
the abovementioned security mechanisms namely intrusion detection and prevention, and IPsec in
order to show the applicability and usefulness of our approach. This approach is general in the way
that it covers multiple security mechanisms, and provides a solid framework for the veriﬁcation of
security conﬁgurations in cloud infrastructure.
7.2 Future Work
For future work, we plan to advance in different directions. First of all, we consider to extend our
veriﬁcation framework to cover security challenges presented in cloud related technologies. There
is a new trend (at the time of writing this thesis) called cloud networking pioneered by a European
funded project called SAIL [93] initiated in 2010. Cloud networking extends network virtualisation
beyond the data center by adding two features to cloud computing: the ability to connect the user
to services in the cloud, and the ability to interconnect services that are geographically distributed
across cloud infrastructures. In cloud computing there are two parties involved being service user
and cloud infrastructure provider. The service user (tenant) manually checks whether his/her se-
curity requirements are followed by the cloud provider, and only if it is the case he/she moves her
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resources to the cloud operator’s infrastructure. Since in cloud networking virtual resources are
eventually moved from one cloud operator’s infrastructure to another, manually checking the con-
formance of security policy by the tenant is not any more feasible or even reasonable. Therefore,
security checks have to be done automatically to make sure that the infrastructure provider follows
the tenant’s security requirement. Fusenig and Sharma [36] present a security architecture that
enables a user of cloud networking to deﬁne security requirements, and enforce them in the cloud
networking infrastructure. However, this work lacks an auditing technique so that a service user
can verify if a security requirement is actually followed by the virtual infrastructure provider. In
this regard, we plan to extend our veriﬁcation framework to the context of cloud networking, and
provide a veriﬁcation framework that enables the tenants to make sure their security requirements
are met by virtual infrastructure provider.
Second, we consider to develop a more sophisticated framework for security policy orchestra-
tion. While studying the elasticity feature offered in the cloud, we believe that there are still several
issues that have to be addressed in the case of virtual machines migration. For example, when we
have multiple VMs migrating simultaneously, the posibility of having a security misconﬁguration
is higher than the case of a single VM migration. Therefore, we can elaborate on this scenario,
and evaluate its impact on our approach. In this case, cloud infrastructure providers and also cloud
tenants would like to have independent migration with minimum interaction since those migrating
VMs may not necessarily belong to a single tenant.
Third, we plan to elaborate a framework that not only pinpoints security policy misconﬁgura-
tions in the cloud data centers, but also proposes comprehensive solutions to cloud administrators
in order to solve inconsistencies.
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